





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नवरचना NAVRACHNA

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Threats and Possibilities of Modernization in Russia

Nataliya Velikaya

Abstract

Regarding modern society as society of risks we suppose that quantity of social threats have been growing up in the context of globalization. Many of those threats need to be identified and interpreted. The paper is based on the data of multidisciplinary project "Cognitive mechanism of socio-cultural threats" which includes All-Russia Survey (n-1600 respondents, 2019), expert interviews (n-36, 2019), content-analysis of mass media of 2012, 2015, 2019 and on All-Russian Monitoring of Public Opinion (1993-2019) of Russian Academy of Sciences. We define social threat as potential breaking of normative order in the sphere of social connection, values, public and private relations, which consider by individual or group as danger, which corrupt reproduction of social and cultural way of life. Thinking about methodology of research, we proposed not to create the actual list of threats, but clasterization of threats on the base of situate, instrumental and functional character. In this logic we point out three groups of threats which help us to describe wide spectrum of imaginations and anxieties: security thereats, wellbeing threats, identity threats. We analyze dynamic of attitudes to different actual threats during last 30 years and offer rate of threats among different groups of society. Using different data gives us opportunities to see mismatch between some point in public opinion and mass media which tend to be more and more propagandistic during last period. F.e. people regard as more actual wellbeing threats which are connected with their everyday life and with worsening economical or political situation. Mass media on opposite create other landscape of threats as migration, losing national identity, losing sovereignty, conflicts with western countries ext. We also sort out the most actual threats broadcasting in political discourse, represented by official power, system parliamentary oppositional parties and non-system political organizations as well.

Keywords: *Threats, Risks, Public opinion, Public discourse*

In contemporary highly technological society the perspectives of security and stable development are connected with threats and risks present in the sociocultural sphere just as much as with threats of military or anthropogenic nature. Indeed, fuzzification or loss of national, civic and ethnic identity, changes in the value system leading to a particular type of reproductive behavior, changes in social structure, diffusion of extremist ideologies and consolidation of consumer attitude towards the environment can be gravely detrimental to society and its future. We can say that the present time, defined by a number of sociologists as a risk society (Beck, 2010), is a fueler for new threats that need to be identified and interpreted. That said, the process of globalization changes both the nature of risks and threats for an individual and the society (Giddens, 2004) and the ability of social actors to confront those threats.

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We share P. Sztompka's concept of cultural trauma according to which social changes intrinsically carry risks and threats regardless of their content, because any more or less significant changes in social life are connected with destruction of the system of values and reference points, rethinking and reassessing of social norms, which is, in itself, the reason of trauma and destabilization of the public organism (Sztompka, 2001).

In this regard, the later post-Soviet society remains quite vulnerable in terms of transforming processes and changes in the sociocultural environment. This fact is accompanied by swings in the social well-being of the population, where actualization of different types of threats is based not only on objective social circumstances and facts, but also on subjective perception of any given phenomenon associated with historical and social memory in the form of trauma.

It can be said that the relatively long period of ignoring the problems of cultural development in Russia has yielded to the attempts of developing a cultural policy that can ensure reproduction of cultural values and cultural capital. We believe that this change in large measure has been caused by real threats to the preservation of the national, civil and cultural identity of the Russian population due to a number of circumstances, national as well as global.

The idea of developing Russia, and the search of optimal development strategies for the country has become not only direction of national scientific research, but also a topic of political discourse. More than ever, in the modern period of Russian history the authorities are faced with the need to form and maintain a common civic identity. However, this new identity is being built mainly on the basis of the "Soviet" identity. It is accompanied by attempts to freeze the political regime (Velikaya, 2019). This controversial situation is complemented by the new consciousness of the fact that nowadays Russia has lost its leadership in many areas.

It is not by chance that the arguments about modernization of Russia, so popular in the late 90s and the early zeros, expressed in President D. Medvedev's political course and reflected in his first presidential message and in the program article "Go, Russia!" (Medvedev, 2008) gave place to the ideology of "new patriotism" and popularization of the concept of "Russia's special path". This change can be partly explained by the fact that initially the theory of modernization was closely connected with the ideas of democratic transition that said that it was necessary and viable for the developing countries to adopt the advanced Western countries' models of economic and political development. Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (Calhoun 2006), the two best-known founders of this school, as well as their followers, linked modernization processes with democratic transformations and improvement of political system on the basis of expansion of political and civil participation (Lerner, 1958; Smelser, 1959; Apter, 1968; Levy, 1966). Due to the third wave of modernization and collapse of the global socialist system, this aspect of modernization prevailed in scientific and political discourse. Thus, the third wave of modernization theories is a summation of theories about late-, high-, or post-modernism. They are more neutral and do not link the development with the "Western modernization". Their goals are more likely to identify contradictions in the process of modernization and its influence on individuals in modern societies. As suggested by A. Giddens, modern societies are characterized by space-time distancing and informal, cyber mechanisms of social interaction (English as a bridge language, use of the Internet and social networks), because they are based not on direct interactions of individuals, but on lengthening and stretching of space on the basis of mass- and interactive media (Giddens, 1991). The problems that accompany modern societies in the globalized age are a confused identity, superficial cultural homogenization, which leads to fuzzification of national identity.

We shall proceed from modern approaches to modernization in the global economy, sociology and political science that see modernization as a process aimed at diversification and amplification of the social system that provides a highly competitive environment both in economy and in politics on the one hand, and sustainable society on the other. Today, Russia is faced with the task of

adapting to the post-industrial segment of the global economic system corresponding to a society based on the knowledge-driven economy where the main potential is intellectual scientific capital and the possibility of its investment in real sectors of the economy, as well as environmental modernization and creation of conditions for an effective development of the human capital.

The first documents in this area are the “Main Provisions of the State Strategy of the Russian Federation on the Environment and Sustainable Development” (February, 1994) and “The Concept of the Transition of the Russian Federation to Sustainable Development” (April, 1996). That said, the strategy of sustainable development was never accompanied by the adoption of relevant political decisions, and the directions of economic and environmental policies provoke a lot of objections in connection with the low economic growth rates. The crisis of 2014-2016 demonstrated the instability of the emerging commodity-heavy model of development in Russia. Presently, many problems connected with the development of human potential¹ are aggravated in Russia, which may have irreversible consequences in the future.

Russia’s further active inclusion in the discourse on the UN sustainable development goals adopted for all countries of the world for 2016-2030 (Agenda..., 2015) demonstrates, at least verbally, Russia’s orientation towards further modernization of its system. In its most generic form, the modernization project presently offered by the authorities fits into the following scheme: shift away from the resource-based economy to an innovative and high-tech one, creation of specific innovative zones that can become engine rooms of economical modernization, replacement of the outdated technical park, provision of scientific breakthroughs in upcoming sectors, then, to a lesser extent, search for and transition to the new energy technologies, and finally, political modernization (Bobylev, Grigoryev, 2019).

The formulation of new sustainable development strategies involves assessment of the existing objective risks and threats which can significantly slow down the conduction of innovative efforts, as well as analysis of public moods and opportunities of society and various social groups to become part of social transformations.

The identification of threats in the sociocultural sphere is a serious methodological task due to complexity and fuzziness of the sociocultural environment, and also because of the subjective nature of a wide range of threats that jeopardize individuals and society.

That said, a risk is something associated with a possibility of both favorable and unfavorable, or even tragic, outcome, and is always connected with a loss or decrease of certainty, while a threat is a real possibility of destructive changes of objects, subjects and conditions considered important and valuable by the society.

We define a social threat as a potential violation of the normal order in the field of social relations, value structures, public and private relations seen by an individual or a group as a danger that throws into question the reproduction of a given socio-cultural structure. In other words, we consider the most typical concepts about phenomena which, from the point of view of sociocultural entities (people, institutions, ideas), pose a potential danger or a threat to structures of a social order that are significant for them (hierarchies, values, norms).

Social threats can be such due to their subject (i.e. threats to personal security), as well as to their consequences (i.e. increase of criminal activities, falling birth rates), and can also be considered as internal and external ones. Therefore, any attempt of classification results in an incomplete list or heterogeneous criteria.

For this very reason, different sociological studies use different approaches to operationalize threats as well as to make an estimated list of threats for a respondent to work with.

A more efficient approach in this situation does not seem to be a compilation of an up-to-date list of exhaustive threats, but rather their conditional thematisation of a situational-instrumental and functional nature - it would help to accomplish a number of project tasks.

Our main focus is on the most common concepts of threats in different temporal contexts and social strata (or groups of people), mechanisms of formation, understanding and translation of threats in the public space and culture.

For contemporary Russia, it is possible to name three large conditional groups of threats, in the "gaps" between the sources and possible consequences of which one can try to identify a wide range of ideas and experiences associated with the phenomenon in question - security threats, threats to well-being, threats to identity.

Security threats that can be caused by wars, revolutions, crises, terrorism, crime, involvement in arms race, instability of the geopolitical situation, internal instability of a country, bad ecology, lack of quality medical care, abusive exercise of power, abuse of new information technologies, imperfection of legislative sphere, invasion of personal privacy etc.

Possible Impacts and Consequences: Threats to national security, threats of violence against a person (including informational violence), threats to health, threats of restriction of individual rights and freedoms, threats of aggravation of social conflicts - from work- to political ones, depopulation etc.

Threats to well-being are formed on the basis of different forms of inequality, on the global as well as on the national scale. We can name as such the gap between the so-called information capitalism and the rest of the world; technological apartheid; Russia's economic backwardness; catching-up development and late modernization; orientation of the country towards primary commodities; outdated technology; underfunding of science; uneven structure of science; loss of competitive ability of the country; shift in balance of stability and innovation; delay in answering new technological challenges; external economic pressure; criminalization of the economy and soaring corruption; bureaucratization; deformations and imbalances in the system of social relations (unfair distribution of goods, social and cultural inequality) etc.

Possible impacts and consequences: fall of living standards and conditions; lowering of comfort and stability level; unemployment; loss of previous social identity; loss of housing; bond breaking; political alienation, increasing suspicion and mistrust; increased social control over a person; restriction of the rights and freedoms of an individual; growth of political and social extremism; growth of aggression and intolerance, antisocial behavior, intolerance in interpersonal communication etc.

Threats to Identity are based on the contradiction between the global and the local, "engaged" use of information technologies (manipulation of public opinion, dissemination of intentionally false information, memorial wars, falsification of history); decrease in information literacy, general intellectual and cultural level of society; decline in the status and significance of the humanities; spread of free practice of sexual orientations etc.

Possible impacts and consequences: difficulties with self-definition; growth of nationalist, ethnic, religious movements; deformation and loss of personality; deformations of cultural and historical memory; destruction, erosion/loss of values, loss of habitual life- and value orientation; deformation of traditional patterns of behavior; destruction of the traditional family and crisis of sexual identity; archaization, primitivization; information overload; unauthorized use of information; "digital inequality" etc.

The problem of sociocultural threats existing in the public mind is considered within the framework of monitoring in the broadest context. This implies consideration of the entire spectrum of social threats that are reflected by society and perceived as real or potential risks and dangers for the wellbeing and development of society.

As in most studies conducted by leading sociological centers of the country, the Institute of Socio-Political Research monitoring "How do you live Russia?" operationalizes threats by means of such category as fear and anxiety. It helps to estimate the level of importance and significance of different kinds of threats throughout a long time span, and reveal their dynamics (see Table 1).

And here is the rating of the most significant threats according to the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences's Monitoring. (see Table 2).

Let us consider the dynamics of how the Russian society perceives the relevance of certain threats within the groups identified earlier in accordance with our approach (threats to well-being, threats to security, threats to identity).

At the first stage of the formation of the Russian State in the post-Soviet transition period, the greatest concerns were caused by the economic problems. This, of course, was related to the intrinsic conditions of the economic crisis of the early 90s. The downfall of planned economy, the collapse of the market for goods and services, the reduction in production - all these factors accompanied by a catastrophic drop in income could not but affect the social well-being of the population and provoke the reproduction of the fears associated with real threats to the economic and social system in the public mind.

During the entire monitoring period the first place among the most bothering problems had been occupied by the anxiety regarding a possible rise of the cost of living, which is directly related to the threat to well-being. In different years, this alternative was chosen by 45 to 70% of respondents (see Chart 1).

High food prices, inflation, high cost of living in general and rising prices for housing and communal services - here are the factors causing anxiety for the vast majority of inhabitants of the Russian country who found themselves in an unfamiliar and unfavorable economic situation, faced with real problems of deterioration of the quality of their families' lives.

An analysis of the respondents' anxiety data shows that the downward dynamics of such indicators as the high cost of living, unemployment and rising food prices, which had been observed from the beginning of the zeros, has come to naught, and since 2013 this dynamics has been showing signs of uprise which reflects the social economic situation in the country associated with a slowdown of economic growth and falling living standards. On the other hand, the chart confirms a decrease in anxiety in terms of the indicator "salary- and pension benefits arrears" (see Chart 2).

That said, the top-ranking indicator throughout the entire monitoring period has been the high cost of living, while the second and third place were taken by the increase in tariffs for housing services and utilities and the increase in food prices, which are connected to the first one.

These indicators are quite high in 2019 which calls us to take a view at some of the essential socio-economic indicators that determine the social well-being of the people. One of these essential indicators is the cost of living - many social benefits are calculated on its basis. In 2019 it amounted to 10.753 rubles.

As estimated by the Federal State Statistics Service, in recent years the number of people living below the poverty line, i.e. those whose income is below the subsistence level, has increased significantly. Their number increased from 14.5 million at the end of 2017 to 20 million in 2019, which is about 13.6% of the population. And this is official statistics, which estimates the capabilities of the consumer basket quite optimistically.

If we consider the median salary in the Russian Federation (28 345 rubles), we will see that it amounts to 72.0% of an average salary. To date, the share of corporate employees with salaries below the subsistence level is about 7.3%. Every fifth employee earns less than 15.000 rubles a month (2018).

It is clear that against the background of rapid commercialization of healthcare system, education and culture, such incomes do not allow all citizens of the country to fully enjoy the most

Table 1 : Question: "What problems are the first to worry you?" (Russian Federation, % of respondents)

	High Cost of Living	Arbitrariness of officials	Increase in tariffs for housing services & utilities	Increase in food prices	Division of the society into the rich & the poor	Ecological environment	Unemployment	Fear of the future	Moral and cultural decadence	Personal and nearest and dearest's safety	Deprivation of pensioners in society	Terrorism	Industrial closure	Crime	Alcohol addiction	Drug addiction	High inflation	Aggravation of inter-ethnic conflicts	Economic sanctions against Russia	Salary- and pension benefits arrears	Deterioration of relations with the USA and Europe	Global Economic crisis
1992, VII	-	-	-	-	22	22	-	13	-	-	-	-	-	44	-	-	-	26	-	-	-	-
1993, XI	70	-	-	-	26	24	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	51	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-
1994, II	58	-	-	-	34	24	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-
1995, I	60	-	-	-	31	21	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-
1995, XI	56	-	-	-	13	21	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-
2001, XII	66	32	-	-	33	31	31	32	32	-	27	28	51	19	17	42	-	21	-	19	-	-
2002, XII	67	27	-	-	33	29	29	27	27	-	29	19	49	21	17	26	-	15	-	21	-	-
2003, X	60	29	44	-	22	33	25	25	31	31	31	16	44	18	32	-	8	-	11	-	-	-
2005, IX	60	29	46	-	23	29	22	26	33	28	26	14	32	20	29	-	10	-	9	-	-	-
2006, I	55	31	43	-	27	31	25	25	28	28	24	13	36	20	30	-	11	-	9	-	-	-
2006, VI	62	32	45	-	30	36	27	30	32	32	20	14	40	23	31	-	11	-	9	-	-	-
2007, I	58	32	46	-	27	37	22	29	29	29	17	14	36	25	31	-	11	-	9	-	-	-
2007, VII	50	29	39	-	26	42	21	33	28	28	21	10	41	28	34	-	10	-	7	-	-	-
2008, II	57	31	48	-	27	38	18	27	26	26	15	13	36	27	30	-	8	-	7	-	-	-
2008, VI	58	29	42	40	22	38	16	27	27	27	12	8	32	22	27	25	9	-	5	-	-	-
2008, XI	58	28	35	36	22	32	23	29	24	24	16	12	32	19	26	26	10	-	7	-	-	-
2009, VI	50	28	36	34	20	31	32	26	22	22	9	15	28	22	22	19	9	-	7	-	-	-
2009, XII	48	33	31	32	19	32	25	25	31	25	-	17	34	25	26	14	9	-	7	-	-	16
2010, VI	51	31	38	29	20	32	26	26	26	25	-	24	14	33	22	23	13	8	-	7	-	14
2010, XII	53	35	43	39	18	33	29	27	27	27	-	15	11	30	20	22	11	9	-	7	-	9
2011, VI	56	33	36	31	27	33	29	24	24	22	-	18	14	29	24	23	16	10	-	7	-	7
2011, XI	56	33	42	31	22	25	28	24	22	22	-	14	13	33	23	24	11	10	-	7	-	7
2012, IV	49	41	40	30	25	31	27	27	24	24	-	14	14	33	23	25	10	11	-	7	-	4
2012, XII	51	44	43	29	24	24	24	26	24	24	-	13	14	31	22	22	11	12	-	7	-	6
2013, VI	50	37	45	31	27	28	25	29	19	19	-	14	12	30	22	19	12	13	-	7	-	4
2013, XII	46	37	38	26	26	23	22	28	25	25	-	22	13	33	24	23	11	15	-	9	-	6
2014, VI	45	31	38	27	22	23	20	17	22	23	12	19	11	24	21	19	10	17	-	6	-	6
2014, XII	50	29	35	27	24	20	21	18	23	23	12	12	11	22	16	19	13	15	-	6	-	7
2015, VI	55	33	30	32	22	20	27	14	21	23	13	8	12	17	17	17	13	15	-	7	-	13
2015, XII	58	33	31	34	24	22	28	19	19	26	13	23	13	19	13	13	14	14	10	6	-	10
2016, VI	59	32	31	29	28	19	30	21	19	26	14	16	12	18	15	15	13	11	8	8	-	8
2016, XII	60	36	34	28	28	17	30	20	19	23	17	16	12	20	15	12	11	11	8	7	-	7
2017, V	65	41	34	33	29	20	27	20	21	19	14	25	11	22	16	11	10	8	7	7	-	6
2018, V	62	35	26	24	32	31	23	20	17	18	16	16	12	15	15	11	10	12	19	6	-	3
2018, XII	54	33	32	26	29	30	25	25	20	21	20	15	16	14	15	9	12	11	12	6	-	6
2019, VI	57	35	35	33	32	31	22	20	20	19	19	16	15	14	13	11	9	9	8	7	-	4
Total	56	33	38	31	25	29	25	19	25	25	15	118	114	330	220	223	213	111	10	99	-	7

Note: (-) – no such position in the instrumentarium; the total exceeds 100% because the respondents could choose several answers.
Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

Table 2

Rating of Threats based on the average yearly values (2001-2019)

	Fears and Anxieties	Aggregate % for all years
1	High cost of living	56
2	Increase in tariffs for housing services and utilities	38
3	Arbitrariness of officials	33
4	Increase in food prices	31 (from 24 to 40)
5	Crime	30
6	Ecological environment	29
7	Division of society into the rich in the poor	25
8	Cultural decadence	25
9	Unemployment	25
10	Personal and nearest and dearest's safety	25
11	Drug addiction	23
12	Alcohol addiction	20
13	Fear of the future	19
14	Terrorism	18
15	Deprivation of pensioners in the society	15
16	Industrial closure	14
17	High inflation	13
18	Aggravation of inter-ethnic relations	11
19	Economical sanctions against Russia	10
20	Salary- and pension benefits arrears	9
21	Deterioration of relations with the USA and Europe	9
22	Global economical crisis	7

Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

important social guarantees. The majority of experts acknowledge that in course of reforms the potential of Russia's social capital has decreased. Its quality is an order of magnitude lower than it was 20 years ago.

If we take a look at the people's self-assessment of their monetary income (see Chart 3), we will see that the group of respondents who consider themselves to be "resource-constrained" is steadily growing. Also, the growth of the "poor" is accompanied by a decrease in the share of "resource-constrained", which indicates that people are constantly shifting between these two categories. (Chart 3).

Let us also consider the wealthy group that had lived a certain growth in the first decade of the 21st century, which then turned to stagnation, and after 2012, the share of this group decreased.

If we look at objective figures, the income polarization of the society has become threatening and continues to grow, despite the fact that the government claims that the economy has stabilized and is even growing.


The presence of a huge and non-decreasing mass of poor citizens who constitute the majority of the population allows us to talk about stagnating poverty. Many Russian researchers have written about it in recent years. But the measures recently taken by the state have not solved the problem and seem rather ornamental. Any increase in scholarships and retirement benefits is instantly consumed by inflation, and the growth of public sector salaries is artificially slowed down. As a matter of fact, even in favorable market conditions, the average retirement benefit in the Russian Federation had not exceeded the cost of living up until recent years.

To find themselves in the most difficult situation are not only the people with disabilities and pensioners, but also working citizens who constitute the so-called groups of «the working poor». They enter into the category that we call the economically active part of the population. Since 2009, the minimum wage has come close to the cost of living. It has grown from 2.300 to 4.330 rubles a month, while the national average cost of living is 5.198 rubles.

There is no need to speak in detail about the fact that the cost of living in Russia is underestimated and is based on the monetary evaluation of the consumer basket and mandatory payments and fees, i.e. based on long-outdated criteria. The composition of the consumer basket causes perplexion. From time to time journalists make reports with an attempt to purchase a daily or a weekly diet with the sum of the consumer basket or wonder why it is proposed to use the public transport as follows: 2 trips on weekdays, 1 trip on weekends (apparently, one should make the return trip on foot), or why the retired should not travel more often than once every five days.

As we have already mentioned above, the cost of living in Russia amounts today to 10.753 rubles². Let us remind that the entire civilized world, or at least the countries with comparable GDP per capita, use a system of minimum social standards, which implies expenses not only for housing and communal services, but also for treatment, education, leisure, books, theaters, museums, etc. If during the years preceding the crisis the number of the poor (i.e. those whose income is below the subsistence level) had been gradually decreasing, then during the crisis the reverse process


Chart 1: High Cost of Living



Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

took place. According to the Federal State Statistic Service's estimates (i.e. based on the cost of living), the number of the poor amounts to more than 20 million people.

Chart 2: Dynamics of Economic related fears



Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).


It is clear that the real poverty rate is much higher. More than half of the poor - 59.4% - are working citizens. Every fifth employee earns less than 15.000 rubles per month (2018). Given the level of inflation and rising prices for many services, this increase does not reduce poverty. Our level of salaries is 8-10 times behind economically developed countries. Moreover, the focus on the minimum salary inhibits the development of the labor market.

It can be said that for Russia one of the most acute problems for the past 30 years has been income differentiation which came as a result of shock liberalization. Despite the fact that the poverty rate calculated according to the national methodology has decreased by about 2 times, the high-income segments of the population were the ones to benefit the most from economic growth. This is confirmed by the growth of the Gini index. After the transition to a market mechanism of economic regulation it amounted to 0.498. The society became highly stratified: appeared such classes as the rich and the poor, which is reflected in the actualization of the corresponding anxiety in the late 90s. Later, the Gini index went slightly down (in 2010 it was 0.414) and the data from the early 2018 claims it was 0.417³.

The average salary of 10% of the most highly-paid employees was 14.1 times higher than that of 10% of the low-paid workers.


At the same time, the estimated ratio of the average income of the richest 10% to the poorest 10% (R/P 10% ratio) in Russia amounts to 16 times⁴. And, from the perspective of independent experts, the decile ratio in Russia exceeds 20 times. The growth of social inequality

Chart 3: People's Self-assessment of their Financial Situation



Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

Chart 4: Division of Society into the Rich and the Poor



Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

affects the public opinion, that traditionally considers the stratification of the society as a threat, which began to grow over the recent years (See Chart 4).

Furthermore, the data from other researches using a different list of possible threats and risks also shows a significant concern regarding the degradation of the social security system. This comes in addition to the above-mentioned decline in pensioners' incomes, and a poor healthcare system, the absence of the possibility to receive medical care, the lack of efficient support for people with disabilities, retired citizens, multi-child families, the absence of the possibility to improve one's housing conditions etc. With the inclusion in the list of alternatives of the positions associated with the degradation of the social sphere, these problems occupy the second place after the group of threats connected with the deterioration of the families' financial situation (see Table 3).

Table 3
Which recent events and processes in Russia make you most anxious?
(select max 5 options)

Sociocultural Threats	%
Goods- and services price increase	55,6
Fall of living standards for a significant part of population	48,5
Crisis of housing and utilities services, inability to improve housing conditions	47,1
Retirement-age increase	38,6
Lack of possibility to receive qualified medical aid	28,1
Reduction of access to free education	25,1
Unemployment	21,4
High level of corruption, strangle of bureaucracy	21,1
Drug- and alcohol addiction	18,4
Demographic crisis in Russia, population decrease	13,4
Environmental deterioration	13,4
Migratory influx, decrease of indigenous population	11,7
Moral decadence	9,9
Increase in crime	7,1
Restriction of political rights and freedoms, including freedom of speech	6,6
Possibility of terrorist attacks	5,4
Cooling in relations between Russia and the Western world	4,3
Preservation of tension	3,8
Loss of national culture	3,4
Spread of political and religious extremism	1,3
Total	100,0
Other	1,5
Cannot say	0,9


Source: Faculty of Sociology, RSUH, research “Sociocultural threats and risk”, 2019⁵ (see Table 2)

Problems of national and social security

As for the group of fears associated with security threats, it seems logical enough to divide them into threats of an internal nature, also determined by lifestyle and social practices, and security threats determined by global natural, socio-economic and socio-political processes.


If, for instance, anxieties regarding crime, alcoholism and drug addiction showed a downward trend, then fears regarding terrorism become actual at certain points of the time series, which are also largely determined by the line of current events and the agenda set by the media.

Chart 5: Dynamics of life and Safety related Fears



Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

Chart 6: Dynamics of Environment related anxiety



Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

Let us not forget that for many years crime had occupied a leading position in the group of fears connected with security, but after 2014 it gave place to a rather broad definition “personal and nearest-and-dearest’s safety” which suggests that the danger is seen as a probability of suffering not only from the criminals, but also from other sources of danger that pose threat to safety. (Chart 5).

Certain groups of threats in the modern society are connected to the ecological risks. In the zeros, despite a relative economical pick-up and delivery of a range of international accords in the sphere of ecological safety, the ecological modernization was never activated. The investments in the capital stock, directed to the protection of the environment and rational use of natural resources, were erratic and insufficient (Veber 2015). At the moment, the civil society remains the main newsmaker in the subject of the ecology in Russia.

According to the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences’s Monitoring, the significance of these threats once again tends to grow in the past 3 years. It makes one remember the numerous scandals about construction of waste recycling plants, transferal of garbage dumps, placement of chemical- and nuclear waste dumps in different subjects of the Russian Federation that have caused significant civic protest.

Speaking of external threats to the security and integrity of the country, their value does not exceed 20%, which confirms the idea that in a stable society (with no military operations or presence of real conflicts) people consider threats to their own well-being and security as the most significant.

It is obvious that the significance of these factors has grown after the annexation of Crimea and the ensuing deterioration in relations with European countries and imposition of economic sanctions, which affected both the inflation rate and personal incomes, and was also reflected in the agenda of domestic mass-media. It could not but have an impact on public opinion.


That said, the experts see this kind of threats as very negative, considering Russia’s reducing perspectives in the globalizing processes. It is evident that even if it is not an isolation course chosen by the Russian government, then these are isolation conditions imposed from outside. And it is a grave risk that can become a threat to the Russian society.

Despite the favorable market conditions for natural resources and the active exploitation of production fields, there were almost no investments in the development of the industrial sector and in the stimulation of innovative industries. Russia’s backward economy in its current form does not have a significant internal resource for growth. Despite the task of doubling GDP before 2010, during the first decade of the 21st century the country’s economy grew by 59.2%, while China, Kazakhstan and Belarus over the same decade showed GDP growth of 262.1%, 221% and 202.7% respectively. Even if the outflow of capital from Russia over the past ten years is decreasing, it still does not reach the dimensions predicted by the Ministry of Finance. The investment climate is not getting better, the growth of political and economic risks is mainly associated with an inefficient tax system, the lack of competition in the markets and an extremely elevated level of corruption as well as with the singularities of the political regime. Let us add that in this sense people consider the high level of corruption and arbitrariness of the authorities as a rather serious threat to social development. (Chart 8).

According to our research dedicated specifically to sociocultural threats, high level of corruption and arbitrariness of the authorities are quite relevant for every fifth respondent (See above Chart 2). Moreover, the choice of this option is connected with the choice of «restriction of political rights and freedoms» by 6.6% of respondents.


It is logical that citizens do not appreciate the efforts of the state in terms of implementing economic policy and believe that the current policy meets the interests of the majority of the population only to a small extent (See Chart 9).

Chart 7: External Threats to Economic well-being



Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

Chart 8: Arbitrariness of the Authorities



Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

According to the estimates of the HSE Centre of Development, the economic growth slowed down. It was accompanied by decrease of investments and cooling-off in consumer demand (Mironov, Kuznetsov, 2019), which permits to expect further downgrade of the government.

Threats to Identity

Threats to identity are determined to the maximum extent by the sociocultural processes of the modern society. In this context, sociocultural discourse calls attention, firstly, to the problems of preserving civic, state and ethnic identity, ethnic and religious affiliation, ethnocultural differentiation and ethnocultural segregation that leads to formation of ethnic enclaves that create micro-territories of stagnant poverty. Secondly, the fuzzification of national identity is often associated with the borrowing and adaptation of the values and social practices of other cultures, which is expressed in such concepts as westernization, MacDonalidization etc.

The efforts of the state to form an identity common to all Russian citizens and to overcome ethnic nationalism have been rather efficient, even though they were not always of a purely humanitarian nature. We agree with a number of scholars who believe that this macro-identity is formed naturally (albeit with an additional effort of the elites) as a loyalty to the state and its institutions, and that this identity has a strong component of historical memory. However, ethnic identity continues to remain relevant, which is also manifested in the high ethnic and ethno-territorial identity of the Russians. It must be emphasized that the ethnic identity does not always promote or ensure national-civil consolidation. Moreover, there is still a request for the so-called «ethnic certainty». In 2015 there was a wide discussion in the media and in the government about the necessity and possibility of returning the “nationality” graph to the passport of a citizen of the Russian Federation. This bill was submitted to the State Duma, and although it aimed to protect small nations from identity loss, many regarded it as discriminating.


Global experience shows that democracy, especially budding one, does not always cope with the rise of ethnophobia. Moreover, the events that take place in a number of European countries allow us to say that conflicts based on ethnic hostility, extremism and similar can relegate other social problems to the background, and that such agenda also changes the political framework, adding to it right-wing and nationalist parties.

The influx of a large number of people belonging to other cultures considerably worries those who live in Russia and is perceived as a significant threat to national security in a large number of contexts. Even without these migration flows, Russia is a very vulnerable community in terms of sustainability, where regional, territorial, ethnic, religious and state-civil self-identification of its citizens have to communicate and interact. In the 90s the majority of Russian residents considered the regional and ethnic components of identity as the most important, while the state-civil, nation-forming component was seen as less significant. In the early 2000s the priority of an all-Russian identity began to take shape. Obviously, for migrants living in a borderline-marginal life situation, ethnic national self-identification is dominant, and that inevitably provokes numerous contradictions with the indigenous people often degenerating into conflicts.

That is why, according to the respondents, in a rather wide range of socio-political risks and threats there are always contradictions and hostility between different ethnics (see Chart 10).


Even though contradictions of a merely economic nature («between the poor and the rich» (79%) and «between lower and upper classes» (71%) are traditionally the most sensible matter, the contradictions and hostility expressed by «people of different nationalities» are relevant for 41% of respondents, «between believers of different religions» for 36% of respondents (according to the all-Russian sample). Obviously, the problem is more relevant in the regions with fast-growing migration.

Chart 9: The respondents' opinion on whether or not the conducted economic reforms meet the interests of the majority of Russian citizens (Russian Federation, % of respondents)



Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

Chart 10: Aggravation of inter-ethnic relations



Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

That said, it is true that over the past two years, assessments regarding the existence of significant contradictions «between people of different nationalities», «between people of different religions», «believers and non-believers» have stabilized to a certain degree. (See chart 11)

In current sociocultural studies religion and confession are seen as one of the factors of ethnic and cultural identity. Religion in Russia, as in most developed countries, is no longer an ultimate source of absolute values. Since the 1990s here is a significant growth of number of people who assume to practice a religion. Despite that, religion does not determine their consciousness and behavior in everyday life. It is no coincidence that presently the researchers of religiosity speak rather of a post-secular society, where the growth of confessional diversity does not lead to a consensus searching, but to attempts to defend and maintain one's identity and to become somehow integrated into various social and political practices, which is not extrinsic to a secular society (see Chart 12).

The full dynamics of self-identification of the respondents' religious affiliation is shown in Chart 11. The distribution of answers remained in line with the trend that has taken shape in recent years: the number of non-believers is reduced (to 16%), the number of those who consider themselves to be Orthodox (66%) is growing, but the number of those who practice Islam remains practically the same and ranges from 4 to 7% in the total sample. Moreover, the significance of the contradictions between believers and non-believers is estimated to be much lesser than the significance of contradictions between people of different nationalities.

It can be said that in recent years there have been rather heated conflicts and clashes between indigenous people and migrants. Let us not forget about the events in Krasnoarmeysk (Saratov Region, 2007), Kondopoga (Karelia, 2006), Khotkovo (Moscow Region, 2010), Moscow Region (2018) and Yakutia (2019). The authorities usually begin to mediate such conflicts with a delay due to the lack of social tension monitoring and efficient mechanisms for managing such situations.

As previously stated, another group of threats to identity is connected with the cultural sphere itself. And here it can be said that the Russian identity as opposed to the Russian Federation identity basically determines itself not through ethnic self-determination, but through «blood», «language» and «culture». That is exactly why the problems in the cultural sphere are considered by our citizens as threats to identity.


More than a half of the respondents believe that the culture of Russia is degrading, losing its national identity, propagating hedonism, violence and success at all costs (see Table 4).

These indicators are associated with such marker as active instillment of the Western lifestyle at the expense of the national culture: more than 41% of respondents believe that such phenomena are highly typical for the Russian society. The degradation of the local language (46%), the destruction of cultural monuments (37%), and the low availability of cultural institutions (29%) are perceived with a certain degree of anxiety.

One should also take note of the fact that the problems of cultural development have been almost ousted out of political discourse, and the approach that considers the cultural sphere of society as secondary continues to dominate the management of cultural processes. It has led to consolidation of the residual principle of financing culture and to the degradation of the cultural sphere, primarily in risk zones - first of all, in small and medium-sized cities of Russia and in rural areas.


Speaking of the singularities of the perception of threats by various socio-demographic groups, we can say that there is a certain age difference. Here is what the situation looks like if we mark two enlarged groups, conditionally called young (under 30) and mature people (over 30) (See table 4).

Chart 11: Dynamics of Economic related fears




Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

Chart 12: Dynamics of Economic related fears



Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

Chart 12: Dynamics of Economic related fears



Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political Studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

There is a completely predictable gap in the assessment of such indicators as unemployment, arbitrariness of the authorities, fear of the future, deterioration of relations with Western countries, environmental conditions. They cause more concern among young people, while the high cost of living, the increase in tariffs and the deprivation of pensioners in society worry mostly the elders.

The answers in terms of the stratification of society into the rich and the poor, higher food prices, economic sanctions against Russia, terrorism, drug addiction and alcoholism were quite similar for people of different ages (see table 5).

The analysis of the dynamics since 2001 allows us to rank the significance of different factors for different age groups in 2001, 2008, 2018.

Thus, in the age group up to 30 years, the first place, as in other age group, was occupied by the high cost of living. In the beginning of the zeros, the second place was occupied by crime, the third - by drug addiction, and then - by unemployment and economic situation. In 2008, after the law-enforcement authorities made significant efforts to stabilize the situation in society and combat criminogenic factors, the crime category came down to the 5th place, and in 2018, it generally did not reach the top five significant threat-factors.

In 2008 and in 2018 the environmental situation took the second place between the threats considered important by young people, while unemployment (35.2%) occupied the third place in 2018, which perfectly illustrates the objective data on a slowdown in economic growth and growing problems in the economic sphere. Against the background of numerous corruption scandals and anti-corruption investigations, the emergence (or awareness) of such threat as the arbitrariness of officials in 2018 (the fourth place) and the division of society into the rich and the poor did not come

as a surprise. It confirms the fact that young people more and more often see the modern society as unjust.

Table 4
Which statements regarding the problems in the cultural development of our country formed in the past 25 years do you agree with?

Statement	Response	Percentage
The Russian culture has degraded in the past 25 years, all its best achievements are left in the past	I rather agree	51,7
	I rather disagree	48,3
The Russian culture is losing its national identity under the pressure of the Western mass culture	I rather agree	58,2
	I rather disagree	41,8
Now we have two cultures - one for the rich, another for the poor	I rather agree	58,6
	I rather disagree	41,4
Modern art and culture promulgate selfishness, hedonism, success at any costs, violence, sex and vulgarity	I rather agree	62,1
	I rather disagree	37,9

Source: Faculty of Sociology, RSUH, research «Sociocultural threats and risk», 2019⁶ (see Table 2)⁷ ..

The group of 30-39 years old, which mainly includes working people who have families and children, presents a different view of social phenomena that cause concern. The first place is taken by the high cost of living, the second, in 2001, 2008 and 2018 respectively, was occupied by drug addiction, increase in food prices and the arbitrariness of the authorities, the third place - by the environmental situation and an increase in prices for housing and communal services, and the fourth - by the arbitrariness of the authorities, inflation, security. The fifth place is taken by the division of society into the rich and poor and increase in tariffs.

The group of 40-49 years old continues to see the threats to well-being as most significant. For people of this group the forefront is occupied by the high cost of living, high food prices and prices for housing and communal services, crime and the arbitrariness of officials.

The older age groups (pre-retirement and retirement age), in addition to the anxiety regarding the «high cost of living», common to all Russians, worry about the «deprivation of pensioners in society», and also about crime (2001, 2008) and division of society into the rich and the poor (2001, 2018).

Education constitutes another important basis for differentiation. This factor shows significant differences in terms of «environmental situation» and «moral and cultural decadence». Among the respondents with higher and incomplete higher education, these threats are always present in the top five, in other groups they are present either just once or completely absent. Moreover, the unemployment, in contrast to groups with secondary or incomplete secondary education, is not among the top five most relevant threats for the respondents with higher and incomplete higher education (see Table 5).

Table 5: Risks (Problems) and Age group

Problems/RISKS	Young people (under 30)	Over 30
High cost of living	55	64
Arbitrariness of the authorities, corruption	41	33
Ecological environment	34	30
Division of the society into the rich and the poor	32	32
Unemployment	27	22
Fear of the future	25	19
Increase in food prices	23	24
Personal and nearest and dearest's safety	22	17
Deterioration of relations with the USA and Europe	22	16
Moral decadence	22	16
Economical sanctions against Russia	20	19
Drug addiction	16	10
Increase in tariffs for housing services and utilities	16	29
Terrorism	16	17
Alcohol addiction	15	15
Aggravation of international relations	15	11
Crime	13	15
High inflation	10	10
Industrial closure	9	13
Salary- and pension benefits arrears	6	6
Global economic crisis	6	6
Deprivation of pensioners in the society	4	20

Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

The place of residence has a significant impact on the assessment of risks and threats. It is quite natural that, because the place of residence is connected with education, the environmental situation is always included in the top five and shows a tendency to increase. The concern about the high crime rate, rising food- and housing services prices is even more significant.

Obviously, these threats are insignificant for residents of rural areas who have personal subsidiary plots. For people of this group such threats as unemployment and growth of social inequality are more relevant.

One should not forget that low incomes have firmly established themselves as concomitant to residence in rural areas. The vast majority of the poor live in the rural communities (1 out of 4 rural residents).

Table 6: Poverty

	Total	City	Rural area
Poverty - absolute	13.0	8.2	26.7
Poverty - relative (per capita income 60% lower than the medium distribution income)	21.3	14.7	40.5

Source: Federal State Statistic Service

However, we shall once again point up that for all socio-demographic groups, threats to well-being reflected in such indicators as «high cost of living», «increase in prices» and «increase in housing and communal services tariffs» remain the most relevant.

The dynamics of perception of various threats throughout the entire period of the study also calls attention. One can see that over the past 15 years fears regarding threats associated with deviant behavior (alcohol addiction, drug addiction, unemployment) have decreased significantly.

With a steadily high level of threat to well-being, in recent years there has been a slight increase in anxiety caused by high cost of living. The relevance of increase in food prices and increase in housing and communal tariffs practically does not decrease, which, of course, has a negative impact on the general assessment of the actions of the authorities.

The fear of the future, the threat of arbitrariness of officials and division of society into the rich and the poor, on the contrary, have intensified.

This helps to understand a rather skeptical assessments of the actions of the Russian authorities. The society firmly believes that the state is a strange hostile institution with its own goals, and that the interests of citizens and people are not its priority (Chart13).

Correlation analysis helps to show how some types of threats are conjugated with others. Thus, an increase in the high cost of living indicator is accompanied by an increase in anxiety about division of society into the rich and the poor and fears of the future. At the same time, it reduces concerns about the increase in crime, drug addiction and alcohol addiction.

The increase in the indicator of fear of the future is accompanied by an increase in anxiety about the environmental situation and the division of society into the rich and the poor.

A high level of fears connected to a decline in the level of culture in society is associated with high rates regarding the presence of alcohol addiction, drug addiction and crime in the society. Let us consider the rating of dominant anxieties at different time points defined in the objectives of the research project - 1998, 2003, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2019.

In this table were included only the indicators chosen by at least 20% of respondents (Table 7).

Thus, the respondents see threats related to well-being, manifested in the lack of funds to ensure an acceptable standard of living, as the most significant. Threats of this range are among

the top ten relevant threats - high cost of living, unemployment, increase in food and housing prices.

The security-related threats occupy the second place - high level of crime, arbitrariness of the authorities and environmental situation.

The threats to the sociocultural order, associated with the level of consensus of the society and with problems of justice, occupy the third place - division of society into the rich and the poor, moral and cultural decadence.

Table 7: The Rating of Dominant Anxiety

Dominant Anxiety	2003	2008	2012	2015	2019
High cost of living	1	1	1	1	1
Increase in tariffs for housing	-	2	3	4	2
Arbitrariness of the authorities	-	7	2	2	2
Increase in food prices	2	3		3	3
Crime	2	5	4	-	-
Ecological environment	-	4	5		5
Division of the society into the rich and the poor	-	-	-	7	4
Moral and cultural decadence	-	-	7	-	7
Unemployment			6	5	6
Personal and nearest and dearest's safety	-	-	-	6	-
Drug addiction	3	6	-	-	-
Alcohol addiction	-	-	-	-	-
Fear of the future	-	-	-	-	7
Terrorism	4	-	-	-	-

Source: Centre of Strategic Social and Political studies. Institute of Socio-Political Research of Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS).

The presence of a wide range of threats that lower the socio-psychological well-being of the population is a serious barrier to the modernization of Russian society and state. Traditions and tendencies of domestic development show that in Russia the government has always acted as the main initiator and subject of reforms. Right now, decades after the democratic transition, there is a potential possibility to involve civil society in the process of development of the most important political decisions, which will legitimize the reforms, expand the range of modernization subjects and provide support to the reforms on behalf of the Russian citizens.

It is necessary not only to rethink the results of the reforms of the zeros, but also to elaborate a program that will transfer Russia to the innovative track of development and help it enter the group of dynamically developing countries.

In this context, it makes sense to consider modernization as «a political project that has an ideological dimension, and not a product of a «natural» development of the system» (Diskin, 2010), which will enable the activation of «new social groups» adapted to the market economy and capable of intense economic activity.

Involving people in modernization processes and making the project of modernization clear to every citizen of the country means getting additional chances to make the people not just the main ally, but an active and conscious participant of modernization processes. It will not be easy to overcome the apathy, mistrust in the authorities and disappointment in the ongoing reforms. It is no exaggeration to say that people need a powerful ideological and spiritual impulse that will once again inspire the faith in its historical strength. But this ideological impulse should not be based on utopia, improbable projects, or appeal to successes and victories of the past, but on a real assessment of the capabilities of our country and society.

End Notes

¹ Chelovek i innovatsii. Doklad o chelovecheskom razvitii v RF (2016) [A man and the innovations. A report about the development of people in the Russian Federation] - Analytical centre for the Government of the Russian Federation. p. 11 // <http://ac.gov.ru/files/publication/a/19663.pdf>

² The decree of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of July 2, 2019 ã. n 461í «On establishing the subsistence level per capita for the main socio-demographic groups of the population as a whole for the Russian Federation for the I quarter of 2019"// Online resource. Informational and legal portal GARANT/ <http://www.garant.ru/hotlaw/federal/1283954/>

³ THE WORLD BANK's official site. Access mode <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?end=2015&locations=RU&start=2000&view=chart>

⁴ The Federal State Statistic Service's official site. Access mode http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/population/urov/urov_32kv.htm

⁵ Chelovek i innovatsii. Doklad o chelovecheskom razvitii v RF (2016) [A man and the innovations. A report about the development of people in the Russian Federation] - Analytical centre for the Government of the Russian Federation. p. 11 // <http://ac.gov.ru/files/publication/a/19663.pdf>.

⁶ Faculty of Sociology, RSUH, research «Sociocultural threats and risk», 2019

⁷ The research was funded by the RFS project '17-78-30029 «Cognitive mechanisms and discursive strategies of overcoming sociocultural threats in the historical dynamics: a multidisciplinary research».

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Socio-cultural Risks of Global Social Processes and its Impact on Local Communities

Alexandra Lazukina

Abstract

Globalization processes of the Moscow Metropolis are going further and since July 2012 the territory of Moscow has increased tremendously. A new administrative region has appeared because annexing of 148 hectares of territory called now the New Moscow. The new additional territory has gone through not only area-based changes but also solid administrative, infrastructural, institutional, governance and social transformations. Very rapid changes has posed a lot of serious threats for the Local Government and especially for the social institutions. The very large, extended and in contrast less populated territory including towns, villages and countryside can't be governed the same as a huge overpopulated city, even as a part overnight. Before the annexing each town and village had their own Local Government with considerable powers and freedom to dispose of their funding. Also governance of each territorial body was more or less based on the local social needs and community had some influence on decision making process. After changing the status of the territory many complexities appeared, despite the appropriate amendments have been made to the legislation currently in force and fixed in Moscow Government's Statement about the Prefecture of Troitsk and Novomoskovsk Administrative Region. Integration into the Metropolis system implies tight subordination to the central administration, perpetuating the dependency that afflicts the Local Government and creates social tension. The paper is based on a vast social survey made by the company "WorkLine Research" in cooperation with "Modern East Communication Development" .

Key words: *social integrative risks, Local Government, Metropolis, globalization, sustainable development.*

Globalization is a very complicated and controversial process. One of distinctive features of the modern stage of social development, which covers almost all aspects of people's lives: economic, political, social and cultural. One of the consequences of Globalization is the process of Urbanization, the flow of the rural population into cities. This cities due concentrating resources are growing not only in terms of population but also territorially, capturing more and more nearby areas. Before talking about the social effects on annexing new territories on an example of a New Troitsk and Novomoskovsk Administrative Region of Moscow it makes sense to consider reasons that formed the basis of the expansion of Moscow. It should be noted that the very idea of expanding the borders of the capital was made by Dmitry Medvedev in 2011 at the St. Petersburg economic forum,

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who at that time was the President of the Russian Federation. According to “RIA Novosti”, among the priority problems were planning to be solved by going beyond the existing boundaries of the City at that moment, could be called as follows:

- overcrowding in Moscow, where the population density was at that time 11,000 people per km²;
- insufficient average size of living space for each resident of the capital - 19 m²;
- increasing traffic flows, creating traffic jams inside the city, as the number of residents in 50 years has increased by 2 times while the area of residence has increased by only 20%;
- taking out from the Centre of Moscow the Federal authorities and place the offices on the new territories.

The decision to join 148 thousand hectares, that means increasing the territory of the capital more than twice, was taken in line with the global trends of increasing urbanization. So in the UN report “Cities in the World – Year 2016” says that by 2016 in the World’s Cities lived 55% of the Earth’s population, and by 2030 this proportion can reach 60% of the World’s population, and by 2050 – 80%.

Table 1
Population of the largest cities of Russia as at 1 January 2019 according to the Federal State Statistics Service

S.N.	City	at 1 January 2019	at 1 January 2018	Dynamics%	%
1	Moscow	12 615 882	12 506 468	+	0,87
2	St. Petersburg	5 383 890	5 351 935	+	0,60
3	Novosibirsk	1 618 039	1 612 833	+	0,32
4	Yekaterinburg	1 483 119	1 568 833	+	0,97
5	Nizhny Novgorod	1 253 511	1 259 013	-	- 0,44
6	Kazan	1 251 969	1 243 500	+	0,68
7	Chelyabinsk	1 200 719	1 202 371	-	- 0,14
8	Omsk	1 164 815	1 172 070	-	- 0,62
9	Samara	1 156 608	1 163 399	-	- 0,58
10	Rostov-On-Don	1 133 307	1 130 305	+	0,27
11	Ufa	1 124 226	1 120 547	+	0,33
12	Krasnoyarsk	1 095 286	1 090 811	+	0,41
13	Voronezh	1 054 111	1 047 549	+	0,63
14	Perm	1 053 934	1 051 533	+	0,22
15	Volgograd	1 013 468	1 013 533	-	- 0,01
	Total	33 602 884	33 434 750	+	0,50

Source: Official site of Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (Founder RISS is the President of Russian Federation)

There has also been growth of Megalopolises and Agglomerations, although there are not so many. For clarity of the presentation of the subject matter will give a definition of this concept : “the Megalopolis (from the Greek megalos, megalus - big, large, great and polis-city) is the largest form of urban settlement, formed as a result of the integration of the main city with the surrounding settlements and agglomerations”. Thus L.I. Tulenkova in her article says that “today, there is the only one criterion (population) to classify conditionally the city to concept “Megalopolis”.

However, this is not quite right. There are different opinions about the population of Megalopolises. Most Russian authors tend to classify cities with population more than 1 million people under this type. There are already 15 such cities in our country, and in the world by 2016, according to the UN, there were 512, and this figure will grow to 662 cities by 2030. At the same time, the official website of Russian Institute for Strategic Studies says: “Cities with a population of more than 10 million people are called Megalopolises.”¹. According to the Federal State Statistics Service, there is only one such city in Russian Federation - the Moscow is.

If we consider a city with a population more than 10 million people to be a Megalopolis, as to the UN, there were thirty-one (31) cities in 2016 in the world, and by 2030 it is planned to increase their number to forty-one (41).

Moreover, recent years have clearly demonstrated that Megalopolises are rapidly moving beyond their territories and are turning into a new special product of modern urbanization - agglomerations. What is behind this concept, which is increasingly being analyzed by sociologists around the world? Andrei Margolin in his article gives the following definition, referring to the National Report: “Urban Development: Best Practices and Current Trends”, Moscow, 2011: *Agglomerations are “a system of compactly located and economically interconnected territories, united by sustainable labor, cultural, domestic and industrial ties, a common social and technical infrastructure, pooled land resources”²*

Probably, this very definition formed the basis for the project of creation the Moscow agglomeration, carried out for a year after the speech of Dmitry Medvedev at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in 2011. The idea was to radically change the focus of the development of the Moscow agglomeration - from the center outside the Moscow Ring Road and create a comfortable, modern, large-scale and competitive Megalopolis.


7 years have passed since the launch of the New Moscow project. Did the plan work? Were the key problems of Moscow mentioned at the beginning of the article resolved?

The average living space for each resident of the capital has not undergone major changes.

5 years after the launch of the New Moscow Project, the mayor of the city, Sergei Sobyenin, at the board of the Moscow construction complex on August 11, 2017, gave the following assessment of the situation:

“Housing in Moscow is the worst in the country and in the world. We have only 19 square meters. This is less per capita than in all regions of Russia. In addition, the condition of those houses were built 50-60 years ago is deteriorating and will become emergency in the coming years. Therefore, at the request of Muscovites, a renovation program for the Moscow housing stock was created. Now, instead of emergency buildings, Muscovites will receive new comfortable houses.”³ So far, by the end of 2019, the program for the resettlement of dilapidated housing in Moscow has not yet been implemented.

The population density in “Old” Moscow did not decrease as expected, but increased, as a result so we can speak of a critical imbalance. The population density, and hence the development in different districts, can now differ by more than 100 times.



Infographic 1. Capital residents in numbers. Source: Evening Moscow

Table 2. Positive and negative factors of urbanization affecting the development of a Megalopolis

Positive Factors	Negative factors
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concentration of people, industry, science, territories of recreational, health and sports nature, agricultural land; • The emergence of additional sparsely populated spaces, making it possible to resettle the overpopulated territories of the “old city”; • Residents’ activities diversification; • Innovative development of territories; • Development of infrastructure in the affiliated territories; • Development of social services and cultural facilities in the affiliated territories. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Environmental pollution; • Deficit of the basic budget; • Consumption of fixed capital; • Rapid construction of densely populated sleeping areas and infrastructure is not in time; • Lack of specialists from the social sphere in the affiliated territories (doctors, teachers, social workers, etc.); • The need for a competent managerial staff together with a lack of authority in decision-making by the administrative authorities; • The psychological gap in identity among residents of the affiliated territories, since they do not feel like full-fledged townspeople, metropolitan residents.

Other problems were planned to be overcome with the help of the New Moscow Project were not resolved:

- The federal authorities did not move to New Moscow (Troitsk and Novomoskovsk Administrative Region of Moscow);

Table 3
The largest urban agglomerations in the world

S.N.	Name	Country	Population thousand pers. (2015)	Area, m ³
1	Tokyo-Yokohama	Japan	37843	8547
2	Jakarta	Indonesia	30539	3225
3	Delhi	India	24998	2072
4	Manila	Philippines	24123	1580
5	Seoul-Incheon	Rep.of Korea	23480	2266
6	Shanghai	China	23416	3820
7	Karachi	Pakistan	22123	945
8	Beijing	China	21009	3820
9	New-York	USA	20360	11642
10	Guangzhou-Foshan	China	20597	3432
11	Sao Paolo	Brasilia	20365	2707
12	Mexico	Mexico	20063	2072
13	Mumbai	India	17712	546
14	Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto	Japan	17444	3212
15	Moscow	Russia	16170	4662
16	Dhaka	Bangladesh	15669	360
17	Cairo	Egypt	15600	1761
18	Los Angeles	USA	15058	6299
19	Bangkok	Thailand	14998	2590
20	Calcutta	India	14667	1204
21	Buenos Aires	Argentina	14122	2681
22	Teheran	Iran	13532	1489
23	Istanbul	Turkey	13287	1360
24	Lagos	Nigeria	13123	907
25	Shenzhen	China	12084	1748

• Low-rise construction for the middle class has been replaced by modern multi-apartment buildings, and schools have turned into huge multi-thousand boarding schools where children are brought from the far borders of Troitsk and Novomoskovsk Administrative Region;

- A labor migration of a daily nature did not stop, but intensified, due increasing the number of residents of the Administrative Region who continue working in “old” Moscow;
- Traffic problems on the main routes of the New Moscow were added to traffic jams inside the “old” Moscow.

The reasons for this situation are understandable. The fact is that any spasmodically growing metropolis absorbing small and large agglomerations, by definition, has not only advantages due to the integration of human and other resources, but also the “reverse side of the coin” - the negative. Highlighting the positive and negative factors of urbanization (see Table 2), which affect the development of the Megalopolis, we clearly see that Troitsk and Novomoskovsk Administrative Region has not yet become an organic part of the “Big” Moscow. It is obvious that negative factors of influence on the development of the Megalopolis after the accession of new territories so far prevail. As attested to not only by the analysis of open sources, but also by the large cycle of

studies that were conducted in 2015-2017 in the territory of “New Moscow” at the request of the authorities of Troitsk and Novomoskovsk Region, where the author of the article was directly involved in the collection and analysis of data.

From the data shown in table 3, one may get the impression that third world countries are confidently overtaking Old Woman Europe and other territories of the world’s advanced economies. However, this is not quite true.

As authoritative sources on the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies website write: “The trend for large agglomerations is largely outdated, reflecting the industrial type of development. It is for this reason that the forecast indicates the fact that by 2030 neither an increase in the number of large Megalopolises is expected in either Europe or North America”.

And although, as Andrei Margolin writes in his article: “The concept of urbanization has gradually evolved from apocalyptic to pragmatic,” however, the facts set forth in the already mentioned UN report indicate that the increase of Megalopolises is not the most positive trend of modernity:

- Firstly, this pattern is representative for developing countries and, first of all, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization member countries (they are shown in bold italics in Table 3).
- Secondly, the developed countries of Europe have already passed this period of their development and even figured out the consequences of the social effects of the urbanization process.

Unfortunately, Russia is gravitating towards the trends of the countries of Africa and Asia, lagging behind the leading countries of Europe in social terms, as the megalopolises in our country are growing, and small and medium-sized cities of Russia are becoming smaller and are losing resources. The accession of new territories to Moscow in the form of two combined districts of the Troitsk and Novomoskovsk Administrative Region is a vivid example of the reflection of urban trends of the East on the life of our capital.

Notes and References

¹ Andrei Margolin article “*The Development of Urban Agglomerations as a Factor in Increasing the Global Competitiveness of the State*”. Moscow 2015 <https://pa-journal.igsu.ru/articles/r102/3590/>

² An article on the speech of the Moscow Mayor at the board of the construction complex of the city “Sobyanin: Provision of housing in Moscow is the worst in both the country and the world” dated 11.08.17 <https://rg.ru/2017/08/11/reg-cfo/sobyanin-obespechennost-zhilem-v-moskve-huzhe-vseh-i-v-strane-i-v-mire.html>

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Factors Determining the Attitude of Russians to New Innovative Practices and Digital Technologies

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Abstract

One of the trends of modern development is the introduction of innovations in everyday life. The population's choice of value priorities in the use of digital technologies depends on a number of factors, including economic, political, social, interpersonal and others. What factors determine the choice of a behavioural trajectory in terms of the use of innovative goods and services? The paper uses the results of a sample study conducted in 2017 in the Moscow region as an information base. The sample of the study included 1115 people aged 15 to 86 years, including 55.5% of women and 44.5% of men.

The results obtained in the course of the study allow us to assess the needs and satisfaction of the Russian population with the use of innovative goods and services. The majority of respondents have experience in using innovations and digital technologies. Although the prevalence of individual innovations in the daily lives of Russians varies significantly. The most popular among respondents are different types of gadgets, mostly for communication or entertainment. The spread of online educational services at various levels of education, the experience of their use, forms a positive attitude to innovation in General, convinces of their usefulness in everyday life.

Keywords: innovation, development, wood classifications, innovative behavior

Advancements in technology and a rapid rate of change in the information space, which gave rise to the phenomenon of the digital economy, have contributed to the formation of a new infrastructure and business environment, opened up extra means for the development of individuals and social groups, and improved the population quality of life. At the same time, new challenges and threats to the social development have emerged. The human customary living environment is undergoing changes, the labor market is transforming, and social relations are reshaping [1].

The current situation poses a number of research problems. In one respect, the assertion about the impact of innovation on the quality of life and social lifestyle has become a truism. However, the issue is still left pending as to how do they diffuse in society, what human needs act as a catalyst for this process? What factors influence different approach of people to innovations?

Sources and Methods

The paper used data from a number of sample surveys, which provide an idea of the prevalence of use of innovations among various social groups in Russia. This is the Comprehensive survey of

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the living conditions of the population [2] conducted as monitoring by the Federal State Statistics Service since 2011 (currently it is carried out once every two years, a sample size is 60 thousand households), as well as the Russian Monitoring of Economic and Health (RLMS-HSE) conducted since 1994 by the National Research University *Higher School of Economics* and Demoscope LLC with the participation of the University of North Carolina Population Center at Chapel Hill and the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Research Center of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The sample size is about 12,000 respondents. The study used the 2016 round of research. The identification of factors determining the attitude of Russians towards innovation was carried out based on the data from a sample study conducted in 2017 with the participation of the author in Moscow and the Moscow Region. The study sample included 1,115 people aged 15 to 86 years.

In order to identify factors affecting the prevalence of use of innovations by the Russians, the following indicators were chosen: use of a tablet to access the Internet, attitude to innovations. The application of the classification tree method made it possible to determine the key factors that influence the use of innovative technologies in everyday practice and the attitude of Russians towards innovations as such.

Approaches to the innovation impact analysis on the quality of life

Most papers in identifying the impact of innovation on social life relate the economic effect, the effectiveness of the economic performance [3; 4; 5; 6; 7]. An analysis of innovations and the identification of a set of indicators reflecting their impact on the standard of living and quality of life is presented in a number of papers by modern researchers. A.J. Cohen in the article "Innovation and Economic Growth" [8] based on statistical data shows the impact of innovations on the social standard of living and the economy of America. The subject of the analysis is the impact of scientific and technological achievements on the emergence of new products.

Evangelista, Guerrieri and Meliciani examine the impact of access to information technology on socio-economic development. The result of the study confirmed the authors' hypothesis that the use of ICT has a significant impact on the economy, in particular, on employment rate: digitalization can promote labor productivity and employment growth, as well as narrow the gap between the incomes of the "rich" and "poor" segments of the population [9].

Greenstone and Looney [10] describe 12 parameters of innovative development that, in their opinion, affect different areas of life in the USA. In particular, innovations increase life expectancy, affect the lifestyle and quality of life of the population, make technology more accessible to different groups and segments of the population, as well as leave more time for family and hobbies.

A special part in the research is dedicated to the issue of the impact of innovation on demographic processes, in particular, mortality, morbidity and life expectancy [11, 12, 13, 14]. The relationship between innovation and social development, which was measured on the basis of the Global Innovation Index (GII) and the Human Development Index (HDI) for 108 countries was explained using the logistic curve in the paper by M. Arkhipova and V. Sirotin [15]. It was established that assessments of the standard of living in the country, both objective (based on the Human Development Index, HDI), and subjective, largely depend on a number of characteristics of the scientific and innovative activity [16].

An objective idea of the impact of the prevalence of innovative technologies on the standard of living and quality of life of the population, as well as the identification of factors that determine the demand of various socio-demographic groups for creating innovations is impossible without the use of a wide range of sample surveys conducted as monitoring, which allow obtaining the micro- and macro level representative data.

Despite the representative number of publications dedicated to the role of innovation and technology in modern society, there is a lack of papers analyzing the factors determining the

choice of Russians and their need for new technologies, goods and services. In recent years, the Federal State Statistics Service has been expanding the range of sample surveys, which within their program enable to get an insight about the demand of Russians for innovation.

However, research programs are formulated in such a way that they primarily address the issue of using remote access technologies in education, employment, and utilization of public services. The exception, perhaps, is the Sample Survey of Household Budgets, the data of which give an idea of the availability at households of high-tech equipment, and the Sample Survey "Reproductive Behavior of Russians", which identified the need of Russians in modern reproductive technologies. The advantage of the surveys conducted by the Federal State Statistics Service is the representativeness of the data obtained both in relation to the population of Russia in total, and of individual regions. However, the sample surveys conducted by the Federal State Statistics Service do not give an idea of the need for a wide range of innovative goods and services and the range of their use (household goods, energy-saving technologies, medical goods and services, etc.). Special surveys are required in order to obtain this kind of information.

The data of the Russian Monitoring of Economic and Health (RLMS-HSE) conducted for more than 25 years enable to get an insight about the prevalence of modern information technologies in the everyday life of Russians. Since 2009, the Institute of Statistic Studies and Economics of Knowledge of the National Research University Higher School of Economics has been conducting surveys in Russia related to the innovative climate and innovative behavior of Russians [17]. Studies suggest that it is the development of tools that promote user innovation that contributes to the involvement of the population in innovative processes, a significant improvement in the quality of products and services and the expansion of new and traditional markets [18]. However, so far the consumer behavior of Russians is rather inertial and remains stable, despite the increasing prevalence of new technologies in everyday life [19].

The prevalence of innovation in the everyday life of Russians

According to the 2018 round of the Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions of the Population conducted by the Federal State Statistics Service, 72.9% of respondents above 15 years of age answered that they use the Internet (64.4% in 2016).

Age-related differences in the use of Internet technologies persist, although their decrease is of particular note. In 2018, the proportion of people using network services below 19 years of age was 99% (85.1% in 2011), decreasing to 92.5% by the age of 35-44 years (69.3%) and to 11.5% above the age of 70 years (5.7%).

An analysis of the goals of Russians accessing the Internet enables to conclude that the entertainment function of the Internet prevails and using it as a means of communication prevail. By a wide margin, the use of the Internet for communication on social networks follows with 41.9% of respondents. A third of Russians use the Internet to receive news, 24.8% download games, movies and music online. Every seventh Russian uses the Internet to carry out financial transactions. A minor proportion of respondents in the 2016 survey responded that they went online to search for or perform paid work (5.7%), discuss social and political issues (4.3%), as well as complete study programs using distance learning technology (2.4%).

In their everyday lives, a minor part of the population currently uses the Internet to purchase goods, more often for buying clothes, shoes and household appliances (15-17% of respondents). The population's choice of value priorities in the use of digital technologies depends on a whole range of factors (economic, political, social, interpersonal and others). Of considerable interest is a quantitative analysis of the factors that determine the choice of a particular behavioral trajectory from the point of view of using information and communication goods and services. In order to study the social characteristics of respondents, depending on their attitude to the use of digital technologies,


a sample survey of respondents was conducted in the spring of 2017 in Moscow and the Moscow Region. The study enabled to identify a group of respondents who are more susceptible to new information technologies, as well as to examine their main characteristics.

The survey results indicate that the majority of respondents have experience in using innovative goods and services, as well as digital technologies. Although the prevalence of certain innovations in the everyday life of Russians varies significantly. The most popular among respondents are various types of gadgets (they were used by more than $\frac{3}{4}$ respondents). This is followed by "smart" devices and energy-saving technologies (every second respondent). The experience of using various types of medical devices and goods (46.4%), electronic displays (43.8%), and sporting goods (32.8%) is large-scale.

Information and communication technologies have become ingrained in the everyday life of Russians, significantly changing their usual way of life. According to the survey, more than half of Russians (53.8%) believe that innovative goods and services, as well as digital technologies, have a significant impact on their life or lifestyle. By giving free-format answers to the question, the respondents first and foremost mentioned the Internet, a home computer, various gadgets and mobile communications.

Factors in relation to innovation

An important issue is the study of factors determining the attitude of the population towards innovations and, accordingly, their relevance. In order to identify the main variables that affect the attitude of Russians to innovation, the method of constructing a decision tree was used. The variable "How do you feel about innovation?" Was used as the target variable (among the entire population of respondents, 69.1% feel positive about innovations and tend to use them in their everyday life).



Initially, the following variables were selected as predictors, which, admittedly, can influence the respondents' attitude to innovations and allow the formation of individual socio-demographic groups of respondents: gender, age, educational level, field of activity, experience in using various innovative goods and services, attention to innovation ("Do you follow the emergence and development of new products or services?"; "What area of activity do you think is lacking in innovation?"). However, the final models included only the following independent variables: age, the use of online educational services, and attention to innovation. Thus, the hypothesis about the influence on the attitude to innovation of a number of factors has not been confirmed.

After the analysis, the models obtained using the CHAID method were selected. Among all the possible options for constructing decision trees, two were selected that most accurately describe the available data. The best predictor for the target variable "How do you feel about innovation?" were recognized such variables as "the use of online educational services" and "attitude to the emergence of new goods or services". The differences in the distributions were checked using the Chi-square test.

Both of the constructed trees consist of three levels and contain 3 terminal nodes. The root node includes 307 observations, of which 212 observations correspond to respondents who fell positive about innovation, 78 feel "with caution" and 17 feel "negative".

Using the cross-validation procedure, which allows evaluating the use of the classification tree on a larger population, it was shown that the models are stable and common enough for all data sets: the risk values for the model without verification and with verification practically did not differ. The matrix of predictions containing the percentage of correctly predicted values enabled to conclude that the constructed model (classification tree) is stable, of acceptable accuracy, which allows to use the constructed classification trees for other data sets.




Fig. 2. Classification tree for identifying attitudes towards innovations depending on attention to innovations (percentage of respondents feeling positively to innovations, %)

Figure 1 shows the results of constructing the first tree, which is the best among the constructed models. The risk assessment is 0.167 (with a 5% significance level, the model error is in the range of 15% to 17%). The acceptable quality of the model is evidenced by a fairly high percentage of respondents classified correctly. According to the constructed model, 83.3% of respondents are assigned to one of the selected groups correctly.

The first group included respondents with experience in the use of online educational services, among them the percentage of positive attitude to innovation was 86.7%. Among those who have not used online education in the recent past, two groups stand out depending on age. Among those under the age of 30 years, the percentage of positive attitudes towards innovation was 73.3%; among respondents over 30 years of age it was 45.2%.

For the second classification tree, the risk score is higher - 0.257, i.e. 74.3% of observation cases were classified correctly (Fig. 2). If we disregard the experience of using online education services, the main predictor for identifying the respondents' attitude to innovations is the fact that the respondent is interested in using innovations and his/her awareness of new types of innovative goods and services. That is, those respondents who actively monitor the advances of innovations have a positive attitude towards them (among these, the percentage of those who feel positive about innovations and want to use them in their everyday life is 80.9%).

Among those who are not interested in innovations (do not monitor the emergence of new goods or services), the attitude to innovations depends on age: among younger respondents (under the age of 30 years), the proportion of positive attitude towards innovations is 72.4%; among people over 30 years of age, it is 31.6%. Among mature-aged people who are not interested in innovations, there are much more of those with cautious attitude towards innovations (59.6%). (Fig. 2).

Among the variety of economic, social and economic characteristics, it is difficult to single out those that uniquely affect the attitude of Russians towards innovation. Basically, a positive attitude towards innovations and information and communication technologies is determined by the experience of using modern technologies in the educational process, the age of the respondent (remarkably, younger Russians are primarily experienced in using online technologies in the educational process) and the interest (willingness) of respondents to use innovation and digital technology in their everyday life.

Attempts to build classification trees that take into account such parameters as the field of activity, educational level, place of residence, standard of living, human mobility in the context of attitudes towards innovation were unsuccessful. There is a situation when the attitude to innovation is determined largely by the psychological characteristics of the respondent, his/her willingness to perceive innovation. Age, as an important predictor, begins to play a role in situations where a person is not too susceptible to innovation. Of particular note is the role of education in shaping attitudes toward innovation [20]. The prevalence of online educational services at various levels of education, from preschool to continuing education system, the experience of their usage creates a positive attitude to innovations in general, and convinces of their usefulness in everyday life.

The RLMS-HSE program allows to supplement the performed analysis with data on the impact of the place of residence and area of activity of respondents on the scale of using modern technologies in everyday practice. As an indicator of such activity, the variable "use of a tablet to access the Internet" was used. Seemingly, the usage of a tablet characterizes a situation where respondents use the Internet in non-stationary conditions to address a number of professional and everyday tasks. Thus, information and computer technologies are incorporated into everyday life. For analysis, we used the data from the wave XXV research (2016).

The following variables were selected as the best predictors for the target variable "Do you use a tablet to access the Internet?": type of populated locality and professional group. Age and




Fig.3 : Classification tree to identify the frequency of using the tablet to access the Internet (percentage of respondents using the tablet)

area of activity were not included in the final model. As a result of the analysis, 5 terminal nodes were formed. The leading role in the formation of typological groups was played by the variable “type of populated locality”. In the aggregate (11,368 respondents), 22.7% of respondents use a tablet to access the Internet. In this regard, for residents of small populated localities, urban-type settlements and rural areas (15.0% use a tablet to access the Internet), the area of activity does not affect the frequency of use of the tablet.

Residents of cities are divided into 2 groups in terms of the frequency of using the tablet to access the Internet: among those who work as specialists, senior managers, public officials, lawmakers, the proportion using the tablet to access the Internet is 25.3%. Among urban residents working in the service sector, as well as skilled and unskilled workers, the proportion using a tablet to access the Internet is 16.7%.

A similar situation is observed among residents of regional centers, but in their case, a tablet is used more often to access the Internet: by 29.0% of specialists and managers, and 22.0% of workers and employees in the service sector.

For this model, the risk score is 0.227 (with a 5% significance level). According to the constructed model, 77.3% of respondents are correctly assigned to one of the selected groups. Neither the age of the respondents, nor the educational level, nor the area of activity in this case also played a significant role in the formation of typological groups. Using a tablet to access the Internet is determined by the lifestyle and quality of life in larger populated localities (cities) and the professional activities of respondents.

The analysis allows suggesting an ambiguous choice of factors that determine the attitude of the population to innovations and the extent of their use in practice. The age of respondents is far from being always a significant factor. At the macro level, the parameters of the lifestyle and quality of life in various types of populated localities are among the impact factors. The personal experience of the respondents, in particular, in the field of education, and life strategies play a role in shaping attitudes toward innovation.

The research prospects are perceived in the development of a methodology for the formation of integrated indicators of innovative activity of the population based on qualitative and quantitative characteristics, as well as the use of statistical modeling methods in this prospect.

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Punk in the CIS Countries: Way from Siberian Radicalism to West-School Activism

Stanislav Pozharnitckii

Abstract

In this article an attempt is made to describe the distinctive features of post-socialist punk, in opposite to the Western model of punk. But the Western punk is quite heterogeneous. If we delve into the problem, it will become obvious that the Czech punks have many differences from German and Estonian punks which are very different from... Swedish. The grain of punk in the most countries, originated around the same time, but germinated in very different and bizarre manifestations. The punk movement in the USSR went it's own wave, created their own tradition and proved its right to exist. The USSR died, but the punk that had been born there is still alive and it's most likely that it's creative way is still unfinished.

The punk movement emerged in USSR in late 1980s. In 1985, a document, approved by the Communist party, was published. It contained names of more than 30 musical groups from Western countries which were forbidden to being broadcast at Soviet discotheques. This was probably a first official document in the USSR in which the utter word "punk" was mentioned. Moreover, the word "punk" was used as indictment. Among others, this list contained the names of Sex Pistols, Clash, Ramones, Stooges and Blondie. Apparently, the Party workers did not sufficiently seriously take on the fulfillment of this very task. For the same reason ("punk"), Kiss and Depeche Mode were banned. Even they had nothing in common with the punk movement.

The punk movement in the USSR was born almost simultaneously with the punk movement in the whole world. Soviet punk movement had a lot in common with the American one. Thus, it developed most of his time in isolation, and was not as homogeneous as it was in the West. The punk movement in Siberia, for example, consisted mainly of people from hippie movement, so the punk community itself was relatively peculiar and self-contained. At the same time, punks from the Soviet Baltic republics were quite different from punks in London or Helsinki (regarding the style of clothing and music preferences).

In the West, the emergence of such a phenomenon as punk was a kind of protest against the dominant role of rock music, in particular, against psychedelic rock, glam rock, etc. However, at this time, rock music in the USSR didn't have such a niche, and it made no sense to protest against those streams. The opposite process happened: Mutual integration of rock music and punk

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music. The first punk band in the Soviet Union was *Avtomaticheskie udovletvoriteli* (acronym AU), it was formed in Sankt-Petersburg in 1979. The name, in fact, reveals loose translation of the name recognized to have been the first punk horde: Sex Pistols. According to one interview, the UA's front man fell in love with punk rock after reading an article criticizing Sex Pistols in a Soviet newspaper. Ideologically, the group was far from any formulated political protest, its actions most likely seemed to have dropped down under the category of modern art-performance, closely gripped by existed Soviet realities. Despite this, the group shared many common features with the punk music: Underground house concerts, "raw" sound quality, outrageous and antisocial behavior of musicians, etc. Later, plenty of USSR's punk bands appeared. Gradually, the local scene shaped its own recognizable features, which were caused by many factors: Socio-political peculiarities of a particular region, degree of isolation from the global punk community. For example, in the Baltic States, punks could easily listen to Finnish radio and watch Finnish TV, Western and local punk music were openly broadcast. This was due to the special status of the Baltic States in the USSR. This kind of cultural affinity between Baltic punks and punks from capitalist countries provided for a swift inclusion of Baltic punks into the global community. In addition to the Baltic States, punk culture has developed in Moscow, St.-Petersburg, and Siberia. In St.-Petersburg, it was more difficult to hear voices of Western culture, if compared to Baltic Republics, but still one could do that. Records of punk music were bought by Soviet sailors who had the opportunity to buy plates abroad, they then sell them at home with a big margin. That's why the first punks from St.-Petersburg were young audiophiles who didn't think at all about political protest and war against the existing in the USSR political system. In Moscow, the state of things was similar. Punk was a fashion trend, something new and unusual. Among other things, punk was popular in the West and prohibited by Soviet ideology - precisely because of this, punk became popular USSR in 1980-ies.

As we have mentioned, the punk scene of Soviet Estonia was much closer to Western punk template. Of course, Estonia did not belong to CIS countries; However, considering Estonia within the framework in this context is very interesting. The first Estonian punk band Propeller was formed in 1978. From the outset, it became popular because of its British-style sound and charisma of the vocalist. Interestingly, the group even had played with a police orchestra shortly before the band was prohibited for radio broadcasting. Some of the most popular Estonian punk groups: J.M.K.E. (formed in 1986) and Terminaator (formed in 1987) were more like Western punks than Propeller, AU, or all groups representing the Siberian punk rock, for example.

Siberian punk was different (Siberia is represented mainly by Omsk, Tyumen and Novosibirsk); It was originally politicized and openly criticized the Soviet totalitarian machine. In addition to politically tinted texts, Siberian punk texts were philosophically and existentially oriented. Special attention was given to musical components of Siberian punk, this obviously was an impact/influence of the Russian underground chanson culture. First songs were recorded with acoustic guitar and incomplete drum-sets. Bass guitar and keyboards were not much used by Siberian punks. The musicians tried to compensate the obvious lack of musical instruments by their energy flow and level of poetry in their texts. Contemporary English punk-listeners, if hear these first songs of the early Siberian punk bands would unlikely understand that they listen to punk. So much their sound differed from the English and American pioneers of punk. Their music didn't look like the English punk, but it was straightforward and served as a supplement to the text. The punk movement in Siberia began in 1982, and in 1984, in Omsk, the most popular and influential Siberian punk band called *Grazhdanskaya Oborona* (or GO, this acronym goes for "Civil Defence" in Russian) was formed. The band was a constant KGB's object of attention, and the band members suffered from permanent pressure because they actively criticized the USSR's political regime (the leader of the band was forcibly placed to a psychiatric hospital, it was a punishment). The level of the radical

opposition of Siberian branch of the Soviet punk was amply demonstrated in the slogan of the punk movement, proclaimed by the band's leader GO: "I will always be against". Later, in 1993, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, according to this slogan, the front man of the GO group will announce his commitment to Communist ideology and their support of the new Communist party.

It would be a mistake to mention only Russian and Estonian groups. We will further try to mention the most unusual and outstanding punk bands in other CIS countries.

A real punk phenomenon of its time was the Ukrainian group "Kollegsky Assessor". This band was formed by a pianist, a violinist and a vocalist in the year of 1981. The first name of the band "KGB" was formed from first letters of the surnames of the band-members (Kijevtsev, Gojdenko, Butuzov). The band performed mainly in Kiev, repertoire of the band included derisive covers - works of Russian and foreign composers. The audience remembered the band mainly because of their stage costumes. Once, this band played music in the Soviet Kiev dressed in the uniform of the Naval Force of the United States. This group was one of the first Soviet groups who had tour in Scotland (1989). This group can be attributed to a punk phenomenon, due to their approach to creativity. Of course, their songs had no electric guitars, political slogans and other familiar attributes of punk art. The group promoted the avant-garde aesthetics of punk. Punk-like approach to creativity. Thanks to one seemingly minor step, the group achieved fame and success. The band created a community "Rock-artel" with some other Ukrainian bands.

Vopli Vidopliasova (the band took its name from Vidopliasov, a character from The Village of Stepanchikovo, a novel written by Fyodor Dostoyevsky) - perhaps is the most famous Ukrainian rock band to this day, and their songs have had a tangible impact on all punk music. The band was formed in 1986. Till 1990, the band toured almost the entire Soviet Union. In 1988, "Rock-artel" was organized, it was the kind of a creative community which solve difficulties of each band in the community by efforts of all groups community members. In 1990, the band made their first European tour. Particular success was waiting for the group in France. In France, the band was offered a contract for 2 albums release. In 1991, 2 band members of VV had moved to Paris, where they had been living for 5 years, then they returned to Ukraine. The band still exists and frequently tours in Europe and in the USA.

Belarusian punk scene deserves special attention. This is not just one of others USSR's Republics. Belarus is still perceived as one of the totalitarian CIS-country. Punk in Belarus appeared later than in other Republics, so probably, Belarus has earned a status that has (at least partially). The beginning of the punk scene that emerged in Belarus in the 80-ies was far from punk in conventional sense. They existed not so long, and underwent influence of the Polish underground scene. The first truly serious punk band appeared in Belarus in 1989. Neuro Dubel was founded by two musicians in Minsk. This band can rightly be considered as a serious punk project that still exists. The band texts contain social and political criticism inherent in Western punk bands, but unlike them Neuro Dubel clothes their criticism in metaphors, as if the band tries to disguise their protest, make it non-obvious. The music of Neuro Dubel is very slow and sad, devoid of British punk energy and rebel spirit. On the contrary, their music is a model of humility, with a pronounced critical position.

The most popular band which is relevant to punk in Belarus is Lyapis Trubetskoy. The title has been taken from a character from the book "Twelve chairs" (authors Ilf and Petrov), a hack poet Nikifor Lyapis with pseudonym Trubetskoy. The band was formed in 1990 in Minsk. At the first stage, the band mostly made parodies on formulaic love songs. The second wave of the band's popularity began in early 2000, when the band completely changed their creative direction. Topics of lyrics became more elaborate. The band members changed their image. In 2007, the band issued an album named "Capital" which was full of socio-political lyrics. Homonymous video clip,

timed to album release became one of the most popular punk-oriented videos in Russian-speaking countries. In this video, the front man was depicted as many-armed deity with a piggy-bank instead of the heart. The clip-video "Capital" (starring Fidel Castro, Hugo Chavez and other politicians), which has become a real Internet sensation. The main goal of clip is to show the alleged destructive effects of globalization (quite Western punk style).

A common feature of rock culture (and punk culture in particular) in CIS-countries is uncertainty of their stylistic orientation. Even if a group could be roughly correlated with any particular style, most likely, in their songs, you would also find elements borrowed from other styles. It's hard to say specifically what is the reason of this style-mixing. The musicians are constantly in creative searching, they are always trying to change something, to bring something special in their music. In essence, this is punk: An attempt to try something new, unknown, something they have never dealt with.

It is easy to notice that in the names of many bands there are references to literature characters. Punk musicians in the CIS countries were not indifferent to literature. This is especially noticeable in the works of Siberian punk bands. Some of their songs are dedicated to literature. For example, in Grazhdanskaya Oborona's songs there were references to Nietzsche, Castaneda, Marquez and many local poets and writers. Maybe punk musicians partially associated themselves with the authors of the books and their characters, or maybe literature was just a source of inspiration to them. Critics of the existing regime, from well-versed extrovertism, claimed meaningfulness and objectivity. Such criticism was perceived by punk listeners differently than the outrageous cries from working class-guy musicians (this way of self-presentation was chosen by many punks in the UK). Surely, all that we see on stage is only the way of behavior of a musician, who can act completely different in real life. Thus, we must pay tribute exactly to the characteristics of the image which was constructed by a musician. Many punks in CIS countries did not reject their essence of being well-educated people, because in fact they were well educated. Some universities have played special role in the development of local punk. The Kiev Polytechnic Institute in the last decade of the Soviet Union gained fame as the smith of rock bands, including punk bands. Students of this institute at different times formed several punk-rock bands. The Institute was allowed to organize informal concerts in their premises, too. In this regard, we can say that CIS countries' punks have been experiencing a kind of role conflict. On the one hand, they were representatives of the global punk movement with their characteristic uncompromising protest, on the other hand, they gave lessons to opponents of the political system (like Soviet dissidents). Role conflict is very complicated thing by the widespread pluralism of ideologies within the punk movement itself. In the wardrobe of a modern punk, from the former Soviet Union can coexist T-shirts with band logos of Grazhdanskaya Oborona, Exploited and Green Day. Badges of all these bands can be placed side by side on his leather jacket. In fact, Siberian punk-criminals, British radical punks and fans of marijuana from California can meet each other only as images on the badges that are attached to the jacket of the punk-listener. It's possible that all of them criticize the same things, but the reasons of this criticism can be completely different. Even ideologically, these groups would be absolutely different, not similar to each other. They have nothing in common, except commitment to the punk culture. We can say that tomfoolery and performance are more important semantic component of any kind of punk, than strict political preferences.

New characters, old difficulties

By the end of 1980-ies, the punk culture in the Soviet Union faced a crisis of ideology: Official totalitarian ideology rapidly declined, yet a new one had not appeared. Earlier, the object of the protest was simple and clear, and the ideal society collectively called "freedom". Some of them meant by term of freedom the anarchy, some democracy, as in the capitalist West (as the antipode

to the Communist system). As it turned out, in those days, some of punks interpreted freedom as democracy, second group as anarchy, and others as a form of communism which was different from that, dominant in the USSR.

However, Soviet punk movement was faced with another problem, much more mundane than the loss of the object of protest. Here is the name of this problem: The world music industry. In the Soviet Union, the group could be popular by the sheer fact of its existence. Music product was in short supply, as some other products, and the average listener was deprived of choice, in fact. Of course, there was a possibility to buy records from USA, England or Germany, but it was illegal. This alternative can't be compared with the variety of choice in the new music stores, which was brought by Perestroika. In the ears of listeners from the former Soviet Union, poured hundreds of music albums released worldwide and the list of available albums updated constantly. The Western music was still expensive, but much cheaper than it had been before, and it was sold without any limitation. Significant part of the local punk-scene was not ready to such competition, especially when Western punks themselves started touring CIS-countries. Gradually (by the end of the 90-ies), punk bands from Moscow and Kiev became a commonplace in the Czech Republic, Germany and France. Overall, we can say that the process of integration of the closed USSR punk community into a global punk-movement just started. All these events mark the end of the existence of the punk culture in the USSR. From that time, a part of this culture would be irretrievably buried under the rubble of the Soviet Union. But the other part would adapt to new realities, and, over time, this part of punk-movement would deservedly take its place.

The collapse of the USSR and integration of CIS-punk communities in the global punk community definitely can be perceived as a step towards globalization of the whole punk movement. However, in the end 1990 years, lots of bands were formed succeeding early Siberian punk: Tiplaja Trassa (Barnaul), Solomennye Enoty (Moscow), Krasnyje Zvezdy (Minsk), Adaptacija (Aktjubinsk), etc. The bands of this type were formed on the territories of all States of the former USSR, these groups enjoyed local popularity, and most of them still exist to this day. As we have mentioned above, in the Soviet Union, punk lyrics had a special role. Texts of the Western punk bands were incomprehensible to a Soviet listener. Even if we put aside the language problem, they were depicting socio-political issues relevant to the Western society. These issues had little in common with the Belarussian and Kazakhstan social realities. Listeners in CIS-countries were interested in up-to-date texts. However, Western English-speaking punk is rather popular among those same listeners, but for totally other reasons. It seems, that for listeners there were two different kinds of punk: Local punk and Western one. The difference between these two punks was far beyond language differences, but in the modern world, these scenes just can't to exist fully in isolation from each other. There were groups who wanted to be a part of the global punk community, but who were not willing to sacrifice their local punk-features. It's like a kind of cultural compromise. In consequence of this, it is logical to talk not about the interaction between Soviet and Western punk scenes, but about their interpenetration. Probably it is this interpenetration that's the key to the popularity of some new punk bands. One of these groups will be considered below.

At the dawn of a new era, one of the most stylistically ambiguous and at the same time the most popular punk bands in the former USSR arised. The Korol' i Shut (Russian: King and Jester) was formed in 1987, and by 1993, began touring newly appeared rock-clubs in the native St.-Petersburg. Initially, the band played horror punk (inspired by the American band Misfits), but from album to album the sound of the band included more and more elements from other styles (folk rock, hardcore, art punk, etc). In the band's lyrics you will never find a protest which is usually present in punk music. The core of the most songs were fabulous stories. In musical component, the influence of punk culture was more transparent. The result was a rather unusual mix of American

horror-punk (which was inspired by horror films of 60-70 years) and fairy tales, following the example of Slavic folk tales. By the way, the most of the "tales" were invented by the band members themselves, so they were authentic only partially, in the best cases. Another reason of their popularity was a complete political indifference throughout the lifetime of the group. It should be emphasized that only the group as a whole was political indifferent, unlike the musicians separately. Apparently, this was enough to gain popularity without linking their music to any ideology.

The punk movement in the countries of the former USSR suffered much persecution and had a difficult fate. But despite this, the punk movement gained momentum and continued to live its life. For Western punks, revolution is a mythical creature, which they most likely will never see. Soviet punks saw the revolution and reaped its fruits for the past 25 years. It has become inseparable part of the essence of post-Soviet punk, despite the fact that revolution was not their merit. Soviet punk felt primal Western origin and their belonging to the global punk community. At the same time, the Soviet punk honored his own traditions and was looking for his own path of aesthetic expression. Perhaps, duality is the main feature of the CIS-punk.

Western punk is not afraid to enter into political alliances with specific purposes. The American movement "Rock against Bush" consisted almost entirely of punks. It would be impossible to CIS-punk movement. Therein lies the main value of local punk scenes, they are always differ from the main branch of the movement. We can say that not only about the CIS-countries. In Islamic countries we can find a lot of interesting and original punk bands. Due to the closed nature of some Islamic States, and difficult access of the punk movement participants to the Internet networks, it's really hard to find current information about the band activities. Description of the Soviet punk lifestyle, the persecution of it by the authorities and all the difficulties associated with their activities in the USSR seem to be a real heroism, not all Western punks faced such problems. However, all these difficulties seem frivolous, if we pay attention to punk movement in modern Iraq and Iran. Punk band in these countries, rehearsing in the utmost secrecy, exclusively in their apartments, concerts organized in the same places. For criticism of the ruling regime the musicians continue to bear criminal responsibility.

The Western desire on the Eastern ruins

Western punk is the movement with strongly pronounced political and aesthetic components. This, according to many researchers, is the main value of punk⁴. Punk ties aesthetics and politics together. Western punk always has its own position and expresses it by all available means. Most of West punk scene is Left-wing: Anti-capitalist, anti-fascist, anti-consumerist. Punk was always inclined to attracting attention. Even at the embryonic stage, this movement in one form or another was protesting against social values, mass culture and bourgeois way of thinking. The punk identity in the countries of CIS - a question that deserves separate consideration. The front man of the first Soviet punk band (we wrote earlier about the *Avtomaticheskije Udovletvoriteli* band) claimed that punk existed only in the West and all punks in the USSR were not clear who they really were. The leader of the Siberian band *Grazhdanskaja Oborona* disagreed when someone said that he played punk music, he called it "suicidal post-shamanic action". The punk in the USSR undoubtedly was different from the Western punk. The segment that was not experiencing difficulties with self-identification, and confidently called himself punk, was generally canonical (by Western standards) punk that could withstand balance of the political and stylistic standards, but it was a smaller part of the punk musicians in CIS-countries. This kind of CIS-punk aesthetically very was precisely copying Western punk. Among the adherents of the punk culture clear rules exist: About clothes, hairstyle, way of behaving at punk concerts, etc. Musicians also adopt the canons of Western punk: It is necessary to tune the drums, what effects are supposed to use the guitar and how must be configured the EQ on bass. Of course, there are certain rules of conduct at the concert (some

of them are for listeners and others for musicians). Post-Soviet punks rather live according to a saying of Oscar Wilde: "To define is to limit". There is a vast body of groups which don't belong to the punk movement, but emphasize the influence of punk culture in their creativity. Punk from the post-USSR lands does not accept the rules of this game, he uses other framework of understanding political situations which is wider than the concepts of "pros" and "cons". Punk musicians seem to try to say: "We don't want to impose our political views to the audience. We're men who speak from stages, we already have authority. But at the same time, we're punks and we don't believe that authorities should be at all, so we leave that choice to the audience". It's the kind of the meaning-bastardizing. This is rather a peculiar way to use the DIY principle. The audience must construct their own meanings themselves. For Western punk movement, this tactic is not new. The first punk band, Sex Pistols, in fact, followed the same tactic. Although, of course, contemporary post-Soviet punks and British punk rebels put in their messages different meanings.

In describing punk rock in Russia, for example, it is important to note its penchant for dynamic change. Punk bands constantly change their sound and themes of lyrics sometimes in every new album. A vivid example of this dynamic is described previously, the Grazhdanskaya Oborona sample. During 24 years of its existence (the group disbanded in 2008 due to the death of the front man), the band started as a Siberian punk-rock with grunge influence (1980), followed to the avant-garde-noise rock with hardcore elements (1990) and psychedelic rock with elements of shoegaze (2000).

One of the main dynamic changes of this kind occurred in the early 2000s, when rock music (including all related genres) established itself as a pure commercial product. General trend of commercialization of art forced punk to find a new niche for themselves (in some Western countries, it happened 20 years before), new ways of self-expression. The punk culture began to search new artistic means of expression, obligatory condition: Non-alignment, no alliances. This can be compared with Soviet internal migration, when the creative intelligentsia was against the government, but it didn't emigrated, did nothing against the government, but also not didn't cooperate with it. Most of the modern punk bands realize the true role of protest in punk culture. Of course, there are some bands who flirt with different ideologies (Left-wing or Right-wing), and even with specific political parties (anti-government non-systemic opposition, primarily), but the vast majority of CIS-punk musicians openly do not act against governments, they just simply try to live outside of particular political trends. For this reason, the punks are doing projects at the junction of two genres and even two art forms. For instance, art exhibitions or theatrical performances and shows. This path has been chosen by a fairly well-known local band NOM from Sankt-Petersburg. Exhibitions and performances weren't commercially successful, but such a goal had not been set. It is a new field for creative implementation of punks who go beyond their usual musical activities. These actions belong rather to the art world than to the political world. For example, the actions of the famous band Pussy Riot refer rather to the politics. Though Pussy's case deserves special consideration.

Punk-prayer: The noise and the fame

Perhaps, the most resonant event in the Russian punk movement is the Pussy Riot band. This band is involved in organization of unsanctioned actions, acting on principles of anonymity. The band was formed in 2011 and initially avoided a sustainable number of members. It is unusual even for punks even with the «free» approach of the punk musicians to the creative process. All participants are represented by pseudonyms. During the shows, the members use masks that hamper their identification (sometimes the band members change each other's masks and pseudonyms). As venues for their performances, the PR group uses metro stations, trolley bus roofs, administrative buildings' roofs, and church (the most famous event of the band). Each

location was chosen by the desire to have the widest possible audience. The band tries to break down traditional ideas about the role of musicians and their perception by listeners. In 2012, three members of the band were arrested and put in jail after unsanctioned event in one of the biggest churches of Russia. It was not the first arrest of the members of the band and not their first major event. The subsequent public outcry most likely associated the venue of the action with the main Orthodox Church of Russia.

The action and the trial were really a popular news topic. According to Romir research company's data, published in April 2012, 70% of Russians have condemned the Pussy Riot's action. 64% of respondents heard about the action, while 27% saw the video of the action in the Internet.⁵ According to WCIOM Russian sociological company, 40% of Russian citizens are convinced that Pussy Riot members themselves have planned and organized the event in the Church. As many (41%) believe that in the organization of this punk action oppositionists most likely were involved. Even without considering specific opinions of ordinary Russians, the number of people who apprehend the action is very large. Taking into account rather closed nature of punk subculture, it is quite likely that this case was the first time in modern history, when a punk band became the center of attention of media and most of the Russians. Pussy Riot received positive evaluations of it's work from many Western musical groups and huge feedback from representatives of different associations located in almost every continent. Anyway, if the band's goal was to draw attention to themselves they gained it 100%. Musicians, journalists and listeners gave very different assessment of the Pussy Riot's music, comparing their music to Ramones, but most agreed that it's not the music that was priority in their "art". The lyrics are much more important. Lyrics of the band were protesting against corruption in Russian government circles, the totalitarian antics of regime, violent repression of democratic protests and against the confinement of individuals for their beliefs. At the trial, the band members claimed that they did not feel hatred to the Christians, and the action was strictly political in nature.

In fact, Pussy Riot is a punk band, which represents the values of American punk (in the opinion of PR-members, of course) and here are some formal indication to this:

- 1) The political position of the band's members is specific and exposed to the fore.
- 2) Their songs contain political-protest.
- 3) The band's popularity is based on punk performances.
- 4) They are not afraid to go into open conflict with the powers and authorities.

Pussy Riot is an American school punk band that was created by Russian activists. We can say that this is only the way the participants see what the American punk should look like. The band has not recorded songs, has not produced a single album, but achieved "merits" around the world more than any other Russian punk musician. Many Western bands spoke in support of Pussy Riot, but the West is not homogeneous. Western feminist punk movement have expressed sympathy for the plight of girls from Pussy Riot, but at the same time condemned their outrageous fashions that emphasized the femininity of the participants and divert attention from the ideological component of protest. The reaction of the punk community in Russia was surprisingly small. Perhaps, the Russian punk community was just not ready to have a dialogue. Maybe because the punk community has not got used to being taken seriously. Pussy Riot themselves repeatedly stated that they were more art-actionists than punks. Most of Pussy Riot members simultaneously were members of a left-wing radical actionist group Voina (Russian: "War"), which organized the similar actions.

Conclusion

Punk was originally imbued with innovation, but perhaps the audience just did not recognize punk in the Pussy Riot actions, or maybe just did not understand its meaning. Russian punk does

not combine art with political views in the form as it does in the Western punk tradition. Moreover, the Russian punk tries to complicate such kind of associations. That's why in the West there is an opinion that Russian punk is apolitical, but it's not true. Russian punk relationship between aesthetics and politics is built differently than that in the West, where the aesthetics of politics merged into a single artistic gesture.

The punk movement in Russia came from the West and absorbed all the elements of the dissident, marginal, and criminal aesthetics of the USSR it could have found. The punk in the USSR had their own special path and did not deviate from this path after the collapse of the USSR. If we speak on global place of CIS countries' punk in the world, it is about the same distance from democratic protests of American punks and from the flat concerts in Iran. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan (each separately) are much more tolerant to such manifestations of protest like punk than the whole Soviet Union 25 years ago. Since the collapse of the USSR, a new generation of punks appeared, but CIS-punk did not dissolve in the global punk movement completely, it constantly interacts with global movement, it partially rejects its value and partially tries to be like it. The path of the punk movement from the beginning can be described as endless chaotic change, development and reflection.

In each country, punk has incorporated the national colors, musical traditions and socio-political elements of reality. Punk in today's CIS countries bears no exception. It is a mirror reflection of the socio-cultural reality. Since it's inception, CIS-punk movement evolved with ripple effect. Each new wave experienced crises of identity and various interpretations. When this process is over, punk, as a subculture will die.

Notes

¹ Gololobov I., Pilking H., Steinholt Y. (2014) Punk in Russia: Cultural mutation from the «useless» to the «moronic» (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series). London: Routledge

² Romir Research Holding, Press release 12.04.2012 [http://romir.ru/studies/328_1334174400/]

³ An article on the speech of the Moscow Mayor at the board of the construction complex of the city "Sobyanin: Provision of housing in Moscow is the worst in both the country and the world" dated 11.08.17 <https://rg.ru/2017/08/11/reg-cfo/sobianin-obespechennost-zhilem-v-moskve-huzhe-vseh-i-v-strane-i-v-mire.html>

⁴ Gololobov I., Pilking H., Steinholt Y. (2014) Punk in Russia: Cultural mutation from the «useless» to the «moronic» (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series). London: Routledge

⁵ Romir Research Holding. Press release 12.04.2012 [http://romir.ru/studies/328_1334174400/]

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Quality of Life and Electoral Behavior of Residents of the Moscow Region with Higher Education

M.S. Tsapko

Abstract

The current decade for the Russian Federation is characterized by many socio-political events. 2018 will be included in the country's chronicle as the year of the successful World Cup, the year of the election of the President of the country and the year of important state reforms. The high credit of trust expressed to the President of the Russian Federation during the elections was manifested in high electoral activity and voting for incumbent President V.V. Putin, including among representatives of intellectual elite. It was the political situation that made it possible to implement one of the most unpopular social projects in the recent history of the Russian Federation – pension reform. The disappointment in the President and the Government of the Russian Federation, the lack of positive results on the decrees adopted, caused a sharp decline in electoral activity, an outflow of supporters of the ruling party and an increase in the protest vote, which manifested itself not only in voting for opposition leaders, but also in demonstrative support for outsiders. The Moscow region is the largest region of the country, which elected its leader in September 2018. The events, that unfolded subsequently, strongly influenced the political behavior of the representatives of this group in the Moscow region. The disillusion of the intellectual elite with the performance of the government, especially the federal one, with the realities of the electoral process have led to that only 48 % of this group's representatives supported current governor A.Y. Vorobyov, and the leaders were the most skeptical. There was no clear consolidation of opposition forces around any political leader. The votes were almost evenly distributed among the candidates competing with the current governor of the Moscow region. This result proves the so-called "signal" nature of the vote of intellectual elite. In the absence of other forms of expression of political will, this method of conversation with the authorities was the only possible one. Analyzing the events of last autumn, political experts have developed a "theory of black glasses", which put on the population, perceiving today's reality. It describes not only the disappointment with the performance of the government, but also some nuances of social and political sentiments of Russians.

Key words: *quality of life, electoral behavior, political situation, protest vote, intellectual elite, Moscow region, "theory of black glasses".*

The current decade for the Russian Federation is characterized by many socio-political events. 2018 will be included in the country's chronicle as the year of the successful World Cup, the year of the election of the President of the country and the year of important state reforms, affecting the quality of life of all groups of the population and trust ratings to all branches of government.

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The high credit of trust expressed to the President of the Russian Federation during the elections was manifested in high electoral activity and voting for incumbent President V.V. Putin, including among representatives of intellectual elite. The traditional skepticism and social criticism inherent in this group of the population were supplanted by patriotic feelings against the backdrop of foreign policy challenges and the lack of a real alternative. The general consolidation of Russians around the figure of V.V. Putin made him one of the most legitimately elected leaders in the world.

It was the political situation that made it possible to implement one of the most unpopular social projects in the recent history of the Russian Federation – pension reform. The need to increase the retirement age has been obvious for a long time. The Russian Federation is the only state in the world whose citizens retire in the case of women at the age of 55. Given the gender bias at this age towards an increased share of women and an ever-increasing average life expectancy, it makes the group of pensioners the largest and the economic burden on the working-age population close to critical. However, changing conditions for retirement, affecting every adult, is a serious social shock and is fraught with negative consequences. Only a government with a high credit of public trust can retain its influence after the implementation of such a reform. The calculation turned out to be correct and, despite the fact that during the post-Soviet period, paternalistic sentiment has decreased significantly and the number of citizens counting only on themselves and their closest environment, rather than on the state, has increased significantly, the reform was adopted, however, leading to a significant drop in the rating of the authorities.

All these processes were especially clearly reflected in the electoral behavior of the residents of the regions of the Russian Federation, where the elections of senior officials (governors and mayors of large cities) were held.

The disappointment in the President and the Government of the Russian Federation, the lack of positive results on the decrees adopted, caused a sharp decline in electoral activity, an outflow of supporters of the ruling party and an increase in the protest vote, which manifested itself not only in voting for opposition leaders, but also in demonstrative support for outsiders.

The Moscow region is the largest region of the country, which elected its leader in September 2018. Its multicomponent nature and complexity of the social structure makes the analysis of the current situation especially important, since this subject of the Russian Federation is a kind of model of a country with large industrial cities and rural territories, science cities and military towns. Nevertheless, in the Moscow Region, we can speak of an increased share of the intellectual elite as long as the military-industrial complex and pilot farms, high-tech industries and high-tech troops, including space forces, have historically been concentrated around Moscow. In this regard, the identification of features in the socio-political behavior of residents of the Moscow region becomes the most significant for the study of modern Russian intellectual elite.

On the eve of the presidential elections in the Moscow region, a sociological study was conducted by the method of personal interviews, which represented the residents of each municipal district and urban district of the Moscow region. 10300 people were interviewed during it. To analyze the electoral behavior of the intellectual elite, we formed a subarray that included groups of professions that require higher education and are engaged in intellectual work: managers, specialists, office workers and students who expressed their willingness to vote (active electorate). It amounted to 2487 people.

Representatives of this social group, conventionally called by us, the intellectual elite, are characterized by a more positive perception of the situation in their municipalities. So, if on average in the array, 55.7 % people were satisfied with the state of affairs, then among the intellectual elite this opinion was held by 59.5 %.

One of the reasons for this assessment of the situation may be a higher level of material well-being. In our group, 13.4 % attributed themselves to the most affluent segments of the population

with incomes “high” and “above average”, while 7.8 % gave such a self-assessment of their well-being in the region as a whole. The gap between the share with the “average” income among the entire population and the intellectual elite is quite significant. So, for example, among the intellectual elite, two-thirds (66.6 %) attributed themselves to the average income level, 59.4 % - region wide. If we consider in more detail the membership of the studied group, then, naturally, the managers (24.4 % with an income level above the average) and, oddly enough, students (17.6 %) consider themselves the most wealthy.

The intellectual elite not only has a higher income level, but also strives to earn more. Higher needs form special ideas about the minimum necessary subsistence level. If on average in the Moscow region 50% of respondents are ready to be content with an income of up to 30 thousand rubles per month, then among the group selected by us, only 38.0 % are oriented to this level, and 54.3 % would like to earn from 30 up to 70 thousand rubles, i.e. for every second representative of the intellectual elite, this could be called an adequate payment for his work. Moreover, the most unpretentious requests are typical for students (54.2 % seek income of up to 30 thousand rubles). Heads of Moscow Region evaluate their work, of course, more significantly – 56.5 % would like to have an income of over 40 thousand rubles.

The material well-being of the intellectual elite was also reflected in political predilections. It would not want to lose the accumulated basis in the process of the next breakdown of the system; therefore, it is characterized by the support of the party in power, whatever it may be at any given time. At the beginning of 2018, on the eve of the presidential elections, the intellectual elite was characterized by a higher level of electoral support for the United Russia party – 46,9% versus 42,5% on average in the region. Probably, for this group of voters, the party in power was a certain guarantee of stability in the face of accumulating difficulties.

The electoral preferences of the intellectual elite and other groups in relation to other political entities did not differ significantly. But the intellectual elite were less willing to articulate absenteeism.

Increased protest activity is not characteristic of the studied group. On the eve of the presidential election, more than three-quarters of the intellectual elite did not allow themselves to participate in any protests (77.5 %).

The youngest of the group of electoral active intellectual elite were least confident in their participation in the vote, but nonetheless 77.8 % of them were quite stable in their desire to fulfill their civic duty.

The electoral preferences in the presidential elections in the group of active electorate in the general regional array and among electorally active intellectual elite practically did not differ. 63% of the intellectual elite and 65% of the entire population of the region were ready to vote for V.V. Putin. The declared support of the incumbent President among students was slightly higher (66.3 %).

The demagogic motivation for voting “*I want to realize my suffrage*” for the intellectual elite is more characteristic than for other groups of the population. For this reason, 35.8 % were ready to go to polling stations, while only 30.5 % expressed such readiness among the entire population. But for the participants of the upcoming election campaign, it was important, first of all, to support a particular candidate (respectively 39.4 % among the intellectual elite and 44.1 % among the entire active electorate of the Moscow region).

Thus, in the Presidential elections of the Russian Federation, the intellectual elite practically did not manifest itself as a specific group with any active requests for change. To a greater extent, they could be classified as the conservative group of voters, not seeking radical changes, and expressing a desire to quietly accumulate wealth and achieve material well-being. The results of

the vote expressed a certain need to confirm the correctness of the development policy of the country, directly associated with the person of V. V. Putin.

The events, that unfolded subsequently, strongly influenced the political behavior of the representatives of this group in the Moscow region. The growth of dissatisfaction with the work of landfills and waste disposal enterprises in the region got into the most popular communication channels among the intellectual elite: messengers, social networks, information and political blogs. It has made this group of the population the most informed about the environmental problems not only of the territories close to them, but also of the remote municipalities of the Moscow region. Add to this the dramatic reaction to the announcement of the increase of VAT, the cost of petrol and the retirement age during the first victories of the Russian national team at the World Football Cup, expressed exclusively with the use of the definitions of "betrayal", "cowardice", "meanness", "dishonesty", and it becomes clear how the most thinking part of society ceased to value stability and joined those who were ready to vote for spoilers. The tendency to reflection and social criticism made the members of this group very determined. This resulted in the fact that even that part of the electorate, which usually stayed at home and discussed the activities of the government only in the kitchens, came to the polling stations, thus deciding to enter into a conversation with the authorities. The numbers tell the stories best: the representatives of the intellectual elite in voting for the governor of the Moscow region did not try to support their candidate, but more often than other voters, they thought about the possibility of using their vote and voting right as a specific way to declare to the current government their disagreement with its decisions and actions.

As a result, a post-electoral study, conducted with the preservation of the method and series of pre-election measurements, revealed that more than half of all votes cast in support of any candidate other than the representative of the current government were a manifestation of reluctance to vote for the candidate from the party in power.

The disillusion of the intellectual elite with the performance of the government, especially the federal one, with the realities of the electoral process have led to that only 48 % of this group's representatives supported current governor A.Y. Vorobyov, and the leaders were the most skeptical. As we can see, the youth, to a greater extent than other groups, voted for the representative of LDPR (the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia) Zhigarev K. S. The support of youth is usual for this party. It is in its electorate that there are the largest number of people aged 18 to 29 years, attracted by the outrage of its leader V. F. Zhirinovskiy. The support of the representative of ecological party "Green Alliance" was for the first time. She predominately carried out on-line activity: the campaign was conducted exclusively by means of Internet resources and became the domain of only active users of social networks and telegram channels. At the last elections in the Moscow region, the group of leaders, as well as the mass stratum of office workers and specialists clearly expressed a tendency towards strengthening nostalgic "left" sentiment, as evidenced by the vote for the representative of KPRF (the Communist Party of the Russian Federation) K. N. Cheremisov. The gubernatorial elections in the Moscow region ended as follows:

As can be seen from the above data, there was no clear consolidation of opposition forces around any political leader. The votes were almost evenly distributed among the candidates competing with the current governor of the Moscow region. The representative of the KPRF Cheremisov K. N., who received the largest number of votes of the opposition, was almost 50 % lead over the opponents. This result proves the so-called "signal" nature of the vote of intellectual elite. The essence of it is not to change the head of the region, but to inform the federal government about their dissatisfaction with its actions, the lack of due attention to domestic political problems, inability to offer a clear scenario for the future of the country and its people. In the absence of other forms of expression of political will, this method of conversation with the authorities was the only possible one.

In addition to a fairly prosperous Moscow region, in September, 2018, the elections of heads of the constituents were held in 21 regions of the Russian Federation. And the resentment over socio-political decisions of the administrative nomenclature in some of them led to the authority of almost random people, voting for which was not in order to support them, but in order not to keep the current governor in office.

In four of the 22 regions, the elections of September 9, 2018 were unsuccessful for the incumbent nominees. In another 3 constituents, the current leaders scored the lowest possible percentages for victory. Amid the growing discontent, such results may be considered natural. The rush of growing anti-establishment found expression in some regions in the form of reduced turnout, where only a third of voters went to the polls. In others - in voting against incumbent governors. Arguments about "wrong", "unprepared", "carried out carelessly" election campaigns yield to the conclusion that the population has declared its disappointment with the policy of the ruling elite. But if the majority of voters voted with feet, not coming to the polling stations, on the part of the intellectual elite, it was a conscious vote against the current government responsible for reducing the quality of life of the population.

Analyzing the events of last autumn, political experts have developed a "theory of black glasses", which put on the population, perceiving today's reality. It describes not only the disappointment with the performance of the government, but also some nuances of social and political sentiments of Russians. Such as the presumption of guilt of the government: *"everything that is done by its representatives is obviously bad"*, *"even if something is good, it is too expensive, for sure, most of it was stolen"*; lack of confidence in the future; decrease in the sense of personal security; weariness from existing political parties and leaders, including opposition ones; a sense of permanent economic crisis and military threat; conviction that the government is trying to solve economic problems at the expense of the population. Guided by this theory, an attempt was made to reduce negativity through the theses of the message of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly, focused on the domestic political agenda, filled with proposals to address the most pressing social problems affecting the quality of life of citizens.

The specialized study of VTSIOM (the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center) demonstrated a favorable attitude of the population to the message. Most of his theses were perceived positively. However, even in this case, the intellectual elite showed social criticism, expressing skepticism about the feasibility of the declared promises from the authority.

Notes

¹ Official site of Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (Founder RISS is the President of Russian Federation) <https://riss.ru/demography/demography-analytics/33499/>

² Andrei Margolin article "The Development of Urban Agglomerations as a Factor in Increasing the Global Competitiveness of the State". Moscow 2015 <https://pa-journal.igsu.ru/articles/r102/3590/>

³ An article on the speech of the Moscow Mayor at the board of the construction complex of the city "Sobyanin: Provision of housing in Moscow is the worst in both the country and the world" dated 11.08.17 <https://rg.ru/2017/08/11/reg-cfo/sobyanin-obespechennost-zhilem-v-moskve-huzhe-vseh-i-v-strane-i-v-mire.html>

⁴ Gololobov I., Pilking H., Steinholt Y. (2014) Punk in Russia: Cultural mutation from the «useless» to the «moronic» (Routledge Contemporary Russia and Eastern Europe Series). London: Routledge

⁵ Romir Research Holding . Press release 12.04.2012] [http://romir.ru/studies/328_1334174400/]

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Postmodernism and The Project of Modernity: Issues and Debates

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Abstract

Contemporary society is passing through a process of social transformation for last few decades. These changes are so profound and rapid that the existing theoretical and conceptual framework are incapable to analyse these changes. One of the paradigms which emerged in the late 1970s to explain these changes is postmodernism which claims that the 'project of modernity' based on the premises of enlightenment has now been over and a new social order what they call it postmodernism is taking shape in contemporary societies. The present paper explores the major issues and debates in terms of the understanding the notion of modernity in the works of classical sociologist and then further theoretical developments in social theory like structuralism and post-structuralism which raised some pertinent issues regarding the limitations of the dominant perspective of modernity, namely, functionalism. These issues later give became the basis of postmodernism, a theoretical construct which was almost unchanged till it was responded by Giddens and Habermas who rejected the this notion and asserted the 'project of modernity' is not over and still unfinished. The present paper focuses on these issues.

According to *Dictionary of Sociology (Abercrombie et. al. 2010: 269)*, modernism is “a term referring to a movement within the arts in western societies between about 1880 and 1950, represented by figures such as Picasso in Painting, Eliot in Poetry, Joyce in Literature, Stravinsky in Music and the Bauhaus in Architecture”. However, in the field of Social Sciences the term ‘Modernity’ is used to describe the particular attributes of modern industrial society. A major concern of social theory has been ‘the analysis of modernity and its impact on the world’. The notion of modernity is closely linked with the rise of industrial capitalism in the West in last two or three centuries. As a result, all earlier civilizations have become either dissolved or altered beyond recognition by the impact of Modern social forms. Thus, Modernity has been a central phenomenon in the western social sciences.

A number of theories have been propounded to explain the transformation of traditional or pre-modern societies into advanced industrial societies usually called modern societies. The modern social form has an extra-ordinary dynamism. Although, initially it emerged in Europe but gradually it spreads all over the world. After Second World War, it also emerged as a model of development particularly among those countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America having a colonial past. The set of theories propounded to explain the transformation of these societies was termed as modernization

theory of development. Its origin can be traced back in the work of two classical social thinkers, namely, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber.

Thus, modernism represents to the cultural transformations of modern industrial society particularly in the field of arts, music and literature in last two or three centuries particularly in the western societies. However, social theorists believe that the 'project of modernity' originated with the growth of scientific knowledge in the period called *Renaissance* which gave an impetus to the notion of rationality in pre-modern societies of the Europe. Three important transformations – the agricultural revolution, the commercial revolution and the industrial revolution transformed the European societies into a modern industrial society.

The Project of Modernity

Post-Modernism can be understood in relation to the ideas and concepts such as pre-modernity and modernity as well as in relation to the concept of globalization. In sociological literature, the concept of 'modern world' is used to denote a particular form of social development. Therefore, the concept of modernity has a different meaning in sociology than its usage in everyday life where its meaning is 'the present'. Similarly, the term post-modernism also has the same difficulty. In order to understand the notion of postmodernism, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the terms like pre-modern society and modern society.

a. Pre-modern Society

The concept of pre-modern society in the present context is important for the following reasons: First, in view of the significance of the social change, we need to understand the basic type of society that existed prior to the development of modern society; and second, we need to understand the basic features of this type of society in order to contrast it with the different types of societies that develop from it. In fact, it consists a variety of the societies which cover a range of pre-industrial societies that have exceedingly different socio-economic and political structures such as feudal, tribal and bureaucratic empires (www.sociology.org.uk/p1pmp5a).

The pre-modern society may be distinguished from the modern society in three aspects- economically, politically and culturally. The economic organization of pre-modern societies has a number of distinguishing features (www.sociology.org.uk/p1pmp5a). (a) In these societies, the work is not highly specialized and accordingly the number of different roles that need to be performed in order to produce things is relatively small. As a result, the division of labour is relatively simple (www.sociology.org.uk/p1pmp5a); (b) The productive process in this type of society is pre-industrial as the majority of the population is engaged in the pursuit of agriculture. Therefore, in such a society, ownership of land becomes an important source of economic power; (c) In the absence of machine technology, work is labour intensive and goods cannot be produced at the mass level. Although, agriculture is the main occupation of the majority of the people but certain level of technology is found in these societies. A defining economic characteristic of pre-modern societies is the fact that they are 'pre-industrial': that is based on the use of tools rather than powered machines. Although, in some communities wind and water powered machines have been used but the main difference between these forms of machines and the more familiar types of the modern period is the fact that they are powered by natural elements in contrast to artificially created forms of power such as steam engine, gas-power turbines, electricity and so forth. In case of agriculture, a vast majority of population largely has subsistence based agricultural production. The overall populations tend to be much smaller than in modern societies.

In political terms, a pre-modern society tends to be totalitarian rather than democratic and socially stratified along feudal lives, which is a close system of social mobility based largely on ascribed statuses. The majority of the population has limited political rights and is ruled by a minority of hugely powerful individuals, largely male. The ruling class also owns and controls the

means of economic production (land) as well as cultural/ideological organization. Custom and traditions define and regulate the roles and patterns of relationship in these societies. Another significant feature of pre-modern societies is that they are politically fragmented (www.sociology.org.uk/p1pmp5a).

The social stratification system may vary in these societies right from the slavery to the aristocracy, estates and castes. Early sociologists used dichotomous classifications in order to make a distinction between traditional or pre-modern and modern forms of the society. Tonnies makes a distinction between 'Gemeinschaft' (Community type relationship) and 'Gesellschaft' (Association type relationships). Emile Durkheim, however, makes a distinction between the traditional and modern industrial society by distinguishing between two types of solidarity- mechanic and organic, characterizing these societies respectively (Durkheim 1964). Talcott Parsons emphasized that pre-modern community type relationships are characterized by what he termed particular forms of pattern variables- ascription, affectivity, diffuseness, particularism and collectivity (Parsons 1951).

In pre-modern society religion is the main cultural institution. Social roles and relationships are based around tradition and custom. Individual identity is clearly defined on the basis of family/ clan membership, the ascribed statuses of nobility, clergy, peasantry, caste and so on. Magical belief systems play an important role in the cultural life of these societies (www.sociology.org.uk/p1pmp5a).

b. Classical Theorists and the Notion of Modernity

Most of the earlier sociologists were mainly focus their analysis on the transformation of Europe from feudal to modern industrial society. Karl Marx, Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and George Simmel focused their sociological analysis on the processes and factors which gave rise to a new social order i.e. modern social order. They were well aware about the nature and benefits of modern social order but what is most important in their writings was a critique of the problems presented by the modern world. Therefore, it becomes necessary to understand the position of these classical thinkers on modernity.

Karl Marx

Karl Marx (1818-1883) was a political revolutionary and social theorist. He was born and educated in Germany. After finishing his education at Berlin University, he went to Bonn with an expectation of becoming a Professor but because of the reactionary policies of government he dropped the idea of an academic career in the university. He was greatly influenced by the ideas of Hegel. Marx became deeply involved in the Young Hegelian Movement. This group which contained such figures as Bauer and Strauss, were producing a radical critique of Christianity and by implication, a liberal opposition to the Prussian autocracy. Finding a university career close to him by the Prussian Government, Marx moved into journalism and in October 1842 became editor in Cologne of the Influential Rheinische Zeitung, a liberal newspaper backed by Rhenish industrialist. Marx's incisive articles, particularly on economic questions, induced the government to close the paper and he decided to immigrate to France, where he associated with French socialists and edited a short-lived newspaper which was intended to form a bridge between Nascent French socialism and the ideas of German Radicals & Hegelians.

However, due to his radical thoughts he was expelled from Paris at the end of 1844 and thereafter he moved to Brussels where he stayed for the next three years, visiting England, then the most advanced industrial country where Engel's family had cotton-spinning industry in Manchester. Early in 1848, Marx moved back to Paris where the revolution first broke out and then on to Germany where he founded again in Cologne the New Rheinische Zeitung. However, because of his radical writings the paper was suppressed and he sought refuge in London in May 1849 to begin the 'Long sleepless night of exile' that was to last for the rest of his life (Cosser 1971: 43-87; Bottomore 1983).

For Marx, modern social order was mainly a capitalist order –an economy based exploitation of the proletariat and he highlighted negative features of capitalistic order. He focused his work on highlighting the negative effects of the capitalism and proposed and worked for bringing a new social order based on equality after dismantling the capitalist form of economy by the socialistic order. Although, his views contest with other thinkers of his time but largely confined within the framework of the modernity.

Emile Durkheim 1858-1917)

Emile Durkheim is widely acknowledged as a 'founding father' of modern sociology, who helped to define the subject matter and established the autonomy of sociology as a discipline. He taught first at the university of Bordeaux and then at Sorbonne in Paris. He was greatly influenced by the French intellectual tradition of Rousseau, Saint-Simon and Comte. In his pioneering work- *The Division of Labour in Society* (1893), he argued against the British writer Herbert Spencer that social order in industrial (modern) societies could not adequately be explained as an outcome of contractual agreements between individuals motivated by self-interests, because the pursuit of self-interest would lead to social instability, as manifest in various forms of social deviance such as suicide. He distinguished the forms of social order found in primitive and modern societies. Mechanical solidarity in primitive societies was based on the common beliefs and consensus found in the *conscience collective*. As societies industrialized, urbanize land became more complex, the increasing division of labour destroyed mechanical solidarity and moral integration, thus rendering the social order problematic. He believed, however, that a new form of order would arise in advanced (modern) societies on the basis of organic solidarity. This would comprise the interdependence of economic ties arising out of differentiation and specialization within the modern economy, a new network of occupational associations such as guilds that would link individuals to the state, and the emergence within these associations of collectively created moral restraints on egoism. Thus, Durkheim focused his analysis on transformation of society from mechanical to organic solidarity and organic solidarity is main characteristic feature of modern society. He also analysed the society as a social organism having a *collective conscience*. He was well aware of the problems aroused due to this transition particularly crisis of moral order but he was firm that through organic solidarity a new moral order will emerge in modern society. His views later laid the foundation of one of the dominated school of sociological analysis known as 'functionalism' or 'functional analysis' which persists in the sociological analysis of modernity in the first half of twentieth century unless it was challenged by postmodernists, structuralists and feminists (Coser 1971: 129-174).

Max Weber(1864-1920)

Max Weber was born on April 21, 1864. His parents descended from a line of Protestants, who had been refugees from catholic persecution in the past but had later become successful entrepreneurs. Weber's parental grand father had been a prosperous linen dealer in Bielefeld, while one of his son's took over and expanded the family business, another, Weber's father, worked for a while in the city government of Berlin and later, as a Magistrate in Erfurt (where Max was born) but then embarked upon a political career in the capital. The young Weber grew up in a cultured bourgeois household. Not only leading politician but leading academic men were among its frequent house guest. Here Weber met at an early age, historians Treitschke, Sybell, Dilthey and Mommsen. Weber is often regarded as the founder of modern sociology because he not only defined sociology as an academic discipline but also developed a number of conceptual and methodological tools for grasping the basic characteristics of a modern, industrial civilization.

For Weber, the most defining problem of the modern world was the expansion of formal rationality at the expense of the other types of rationality and the resulting emergence of the iron cage of rationality. People, increasingly, were being imprisoned in this iron cage. As a result, they

were progressively unable to express some of their most human characteristics. Although, Weber recognized the advantages of the advancement of bureaucracy over earlier organization forms- but he was most concern with the problems posed by rationalization, a key characteristic of the modern society. He is considered as one of the pioneers who developed a solid theoretical framework for the analysis of modernity in European societies (Cosser 1971: 217-260).

Georg Simmel (1858-1918)

Georg Simmel was born on March 1, 1858 in Berlin. "After graduating from Gymnasium, Simmel studied history and philosophy at the university of Berlin with some of the most important academic figures of the day: the historians, Mommsen, Treitschke, Sybel and Droysen, the philosopher's Harms and Zeller, the art historian Hermann Grimm, the Anthropologist Lazarus and Steinthal, and the psychologist Bastian" (Cosser 1971: 177). Deeply tied with intellectual milieu of Berlin, he decided to stay at the University of Berlin, where he became *privatdozent* (an unpaid lecturer dependent on students' fees) in 1885. His lectures ranged from logic and the history of philosophy to ethics, social psychology and sociology. He was a very popular lecturer and his lectures soon became leading intellectual events, not only for students but for the cultural elite of Berlin. In 1901, he was granted the rank of *Ausserordentlicher Professor* (a purely honorary title that still did not allow him to take part in academic affairs of the university). However, by now, he was a man of great eminence, whose fame spread not only to other European countries but also in the academic circles of the United States. He was the author of 6 books and more than 70 articles, many of which were translated into English, French, Italian, Polish and Russian. Simmel's sociological method and his programme of study may be set alongside the work of Durkheim in its scholarly importance. Durkheim focused his attention on the social structure that is the larger institutional structure, religious and educational, and on the overall values that bind societies together and create bonds between individuals. In contrast, Simmel's focus was mainly on micro sociological enterprise: his principle concern was with social process. He illuminates the intricate patterns in which individual actors interact with one another through which interaction help structure and re-structure the social world. His formal sociology, the geometry of social space, provided a preliminary map, which allowed later investigators to locate and often even to predict moves of social actors who are caught in webs of group relations at the same time as they attempt to transcend them.

All these above-mentioned social thinkers can be said to be the theorists of modernity, as they in one or the other way were concerned with the analysis of the origin and growth of the modern society in Europe and developed conceptual and methodological tools to study the ascending modern society. However, they differ from each other in their approach, level of analysis and epistemological orientation. Karl Marx was greatly influenced by Hegelian approach to study the social phenomena particularly his dialectical method which is reflected in the writings of Marx throughout. Durkheim, on the other hand, was greatly influenced by positive philosophy of Saint-Simon and August Comte as well as by the organismic model of the Darwinism and founded one of the dominant schools in the discipline of sociology known as functionalism and established a science of society aimed to analyse the evolution of modern industrial society.

Max Weber represented the legacy of German historians and philosophers of his time and was greatly influenced by the idealistic tradition of German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey and attempted to establish sociology as a discipline and presented a profound analysis of the rise of Capitalism in Europe in his famous work *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1930). In other words, like Durkheim and Marx, he is also a theorist of modernity. However, Georg Simmel has been described by Frisbi (1992) as a modernist and also as a post-modernist by Jaworsky (1997) and Weinstein and Weinstein (1993). According to Frisbi, "Simmel is the first sociologist of 'the modernity' (Frisbi 1992: 59), as he investigated modernity primarily in two major inter-related sites- the city

and the money economy. The city is where modernity is concentrated or intensified, whereas the money economy involves the diffusion of modernity, its extension (Fresbi 1992: 69). In Frisby's view, Simmel concentrates on the experience of modernity. The key elements of that experience—time, space and contingent causality—are central aspects of at least some of the contemporary theories of modernity exemplified in the works of Anthony Giddens, Ulrich Beck, Zigmunt Bauman, Habermas and Manuel Castells.

Although, modernist theory had provided a dominant explanation of the origin and growth of modern industrial society in the West but there were problems with this kind of theorization. Talcott Parsons, an American Sociologist, attained a dominant position not only in American Sociology but also in the Europe. He has developed a theoretical system based on the work of economist Marshall and three prominent sociological thinkers namely: Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto. He has rejected utilitarian theory of Adam Smith and developed a voluntaristic theory of social action. Later on, he developed a theoretical framework called social system for the analysis of modern industrial society, particularly the American society. The Parsonian theory dominated the academic disciplines for about three decades. This theory is also called structural-functional theory and Parsons is considered as an arch functionalist. This theoretical position faced criticism from several quarters particularly in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the theory of structuralism.

i. Structuralism and Post-Structuralism

Structuralism

While Structural-functional theorists recognize that actions are shaped by people's structural circumstances, some of their critics have claimed that these theorists have been insufficiently radical in their understanding of social structure. This criticism, coming from structuralist writers, who hold that structural-functionalists have limited their attention to relatively superficial features of social life—observable social relations, social organizations and social institutions—and have ignored the 'deep structures' that are responsible for them (Scott 1995: 155). These deep structures, it is held, have causal priority over the surface structures or (superficial features of social life) studied by structural-functionalism but a sociologist should focus their attention on the discovery of the deep structures of the social life. Therefore, structuralism posed a problem for structural functional analysis.

This theoretical position of structuralist has its root in the linguistic analysis of Saussure who emphasized on the study of the grammatical structure of speech rather than the surface features of the speech. Borrowing this idea from Saussure, structuralists argue that there is also a 'grammar' to social interaction (Scott 1995: 155)¹⁷. Claude Levi-Strauss has been a central figure to the structuralist tradition. Although his work gave birth to two quite distinct research programs: 'the analysis of cultural codes' and 'the analysis of kinship system' which inspired a distinct branch of Marxism called 'Marxist structuralism' which emphasizes on 'the material structures of social relations', mainly represented in the work of Louis Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas' and Maurice Godelier. Although, structural Marxism and structuralism in general are both interested in 'structures', however, each field conceptualizes structure in a different manner. Both schools see structures as 'real' (Albeit invisible), but they differ markedly on the nature of the structure that they consider real. For Levi-Strauss, the focus is on the structure of the mind, whereas for structural-Marxists, it is on the 'underlying structure' of society. What is most important for both is that they reject empiricism and accept a concern for 'underlying invisible structures' (Scott 1995: 155). However, theory of structuralism was criticized on various grounds particularly by Post-Structuralists and a new school of social theory called 'Post-structuralism' emerged.

Post-Structuralism

It is a form of analysis, primarily in literary criticism, particularly associated with French Philosopher Jacques Derrida, often opposed to 'structuralism'. Derrida saw his work as consistent with the real principals of structuralism, in the sense that the fundamental idea is 'that we cannot apprehend reality without the intervention of language' (Abercrombie et.al. 2010: 303) 'This prioritizes the study of language or texts. Texts can be understood only in relation to other texts not in relation to an external reality against which they can be tested or measured. The principle of inter-textuality holds that the meaning of a text is produced in reference to other texts' (Abercrombie et.al. 2010: 303).

Further, 'Post-Structuralism adopted the position of anti-humanism, that is, it criticizes the residual humanism of social theory, which privileged speech over writing. Radical versions of post-structuralism also argue that sociology is no longer feasible as a discipline, because it is based on outmoded notions of the social.' (Abercrombie et.al. 2010: 303)

Derrida, in contrast to the structuralist (especially those who followed the linguistic term and who saw people as being constrained by the structure of language), reduced language to 'writing that does not constrain its subjects'. Furthermore, Derrida also saw social institutions as nothing but writing and therefore as unable to constrain people. In contemporary terms, Derrida de-constructed language and social institutions (Trifonas 1996), and when he had finished, all he found there was writing, while there is still a focus here on language, writing is not a structure that constrains people. Furthermore, while the structuralist saw order and stability in the language system, Derrida sees language as disorderly and unstable. Different contexts give words different meanings. As a result, the language system cannot have the constraining power over people that the structuralist think it does. Furthermore, it is impossible for scientist to search for the underlying laws of language as suggested by the structuralists. Thus, Derrida offers what is ultimately subversive, de-constructive perspective. This sub-version and de-construction become even more important with the emergence of post-modernism. Before we move to Post-modernism it is important to understand fully the views of Derrida and Micheal Foucault on Post-structuralism.

Derrida attacked the dominated western social thought known as *logocentrism* that is *the search for a universal system of thought that reveals what is true, right, and beautiful and so on*. According to Derrida, "this approach has contributed to the historical repression and suppression of writing since Plato" (1978: 196). This has led to the closure not only of philosophy, but also to that of human sciences. This was the reason why Derrida is interested in deconstructing this repression (the source of closure) and thereby freeing writings from the things that enslave it. In other words, it can be said that Derrida focus is on "the de-construction of logocentrism" (1978: 230).

Derrida (1978) discussed at a length the example of the traditional theatre which is theological and a controlled, enslaved theatre. In his own words:

"The stage is theological for as long as its structure, following the entirety of tradition, comports the following elements: an author-creator who, absent and from afar, is armed with a text and keeps watch over, assembles, regulates the time or the meaning of representation... He lets representation represent him through representatives, directors or actors, enslaved interpreters ... who ... more or less directly represent the thought of the "creator". Interpretive slaves who faithfully execute the providential designs of the 'master' ... Finally, the theological stage comports a passive, sealed public, a public of spectators, of consumers of enjoyers" (Derrida 1978: 235).

In contrast to this, Derrida visualized an alternative stage in which "speech will cease to govern the state" (Derrida 1978: 239). On the other hand, "the stage no longer will be governed by authors and texts. The actor will no longer take dictation: the writers will no longer be dictators of what transpires on the stage" (Derrida 1978: 247). Although he is not very clear about this alternative

stage but he gives some hint when he says “the theater of cruelty would be an art of difference and of expenditure without economy, without reserve, without return, without history” (Derrida 1978: 239).

It is clear from the above that Derrida emphasizes on the de-construction of the traditional theatre. By implication, he also wants to see society free of the ideas of all the intellectual authorities who have created the dominant discourse. In other words, Derrida wants to see everyone be free to be a writer.

“This theoretical position of the Derrida has implication for the well-known concern of the post-structuralist (as well as of post-modernists): *decentering*. Here Derrida wants the theatre to move away from its traditional ‘center’ its focus on writers (the authorities) and their expectations and wants to give the actors more free play” (Ritzer 2012: 610). This notion can be extended to society as a whole. Derrida, in fact, associates the centre with the answer and therefore ultimately with death. The centre is linked with the absence of that (death) which is essential to Derrida: “Play and difference” (Derrida 1978: 297). In his view, ‘theatre or society without play and difference can be seen as being dead. In contrast, a theatre or a society without a centre would be infinitely open, ongoing and self-reflexive’. Derrida concludes that the future “is neither to be awaited nor to be refound” (Derrida 1978: 300). Here his emphasis is that we are not going to find the future in the past (contrary to the modernists thesis), nor should we passively await our fate. Rather the future is to be found, is being made, is being written, in what we are doing (Ritzer 2012: 612).

From the above discussion it is now clear that Derrida has criticized both the modernism as well as the structuralism in the sense that both the approaches are static in nature and see the individual as a passive actor whose script has already been written and therefore he has no scope to make his future away from the already written script in the existing structure of the society and emphasizes on decentering the structure by the process of de-construction of static structures. In this way, his post-structuralism provides a kind of dynamism to the society which is open and gives opportunity to the individual actors to make their future through their present. However, it is not clear that in what direction society will move after de-construction. How the behavior of the individual members will be regularized after the de-construction of the society. This leads us to move to another important contributor to post-structuralism, namely Michel Foucault.

Michel Foucault

Foucault (1926-1984) who was a French, was particularly influenced intellectually by Marx, Freud and the philosopher Nietzsche. He is usually regarded as Post-structuralist, although he himself would have rejected that label as he would also that of sociologist. In Post-structuralism, we found the idea that the world is created by different kinds of languages, or discourses. These construct the world (society), giving it particular forms (Maynard 1989: 30). “Although the work of Foucault, heavily influenced by the whole structuralist tradition, attempted a complete break with all forms of essentialism (arguments which reduce the complexity of social phenomena to a single dimension are often criticized as essentialist). He rejected all holistic, functionalist and systemic conceptions of social phenomena and in particular he rejected the Althusserian idea of ‘totality’ structured in dominance” (Scott 1995: 184). Foucault’s approach and past structuralism more generally shows a variety of theoretical inputs. This variety makes his work provocative and difficult to handle. His ideas are not simply adopted from other thinkers but are transformed as they are integrated into Foucault’s unusual theoretical orientation. Consequently, he could not be fitted in any of the various schools of social thought. His work is influenced by Weber’s theory of rationalization, Marxian ideas are also found in his work but differ Marxist treatment of power and pre-dominance of one institution (economy) over the others. Although he was also influenced by structuralism but rejected its many assumptions. He was also influenced by phenomenological approach but rejects

the idea of an autonomous, meaning-giving subject. What is most important is that Foucault adopted Nietzsche's interests in the relationship between power and knowledge.

Foucault's view of the 'social' was organized around two elements: the material phenomena of power and the cultural phenomena of discourse. Each of these dimensions of social reality is understood in a de-centered way, as diverse and autonomous agencies and organizations, and the combination of power and discourse is seen in similarly kaleidoscopic terms. While the phenomena of power and discourse are 'structured' and 'structuring', they are not to be seen as structural wholes. In stressing the plurality and diversity ('difference') in material and cultural forms of social life, Foucault rejected the idea that there is an essence or purpose behind society, culture or history. It is for this reason that Foucault saw himself as being a 'Post-structuralist' rather than a 'structuralist'. He abandoned the conception of 'structure' as being too bound up with integrationist style of thought, and he replaced concepts of material and cultural structures (of Althusser and Levi-Strauss) with those of power and discourse.

Power and discourse are inter-dependent elements in the organization of social life while he focused his attention on changing discourse and their impact on formation of individuals, discourses were seen as effected in and through power relations. As Foucault rejected the idea of causal role of active individual subjects, power was not seen in Weberian terms but as the result of mechanisms that operate independently of particular individuals. It is through power that forms of discourse are produced and transformed and it is also through discourse that structures of power are produced and reproduced. Indeed discourse, knowledge and power are so clearly related that Foucault, often wrote of 'power/knowledge'.

Social reality constitutes a highly diverse collection of discourses, of structures of power/knowledge, but there is no overall integration of these into a single 'culture' or 'social system'. Social reality is a disperse regularity of unevenly developing levels of discourse. It comprises intellectual discourses, social organizations, architectural forms, laws and regulations, administrative processes, scientific statements and so on, each having its own specific and distinctive features. Each discourse is carried by a specific social group and it reflects their particular perspective and interests. The clash of discourses reflects the struggle of these groups for power and domination over one another, and the consequent fragmentation of discourse means that there is incommensurability among the various discourses that make up the social world.

The discourses of human sciences themselves figured in Foucault's general studies in methodologies. Psychology, sociology, economics, linguistics and other social sciences were all seen as contributing to the construction of the modern concept of 'man' (Foucault 1966; 1971). Indeed, Foucault stressed that the conception of individual human subject was the product of a very specific set of discourses and that there is, therefore, no warrant for positing 'the individual', as the fundamental unit of analysis in social theory. It is not the case that social processes are the result of individual action. Rather, individuals are the result of social practices rooted in specific form of discourse. Individual subjects are the bearers and the results of power relations. Even such an apparently individual and personnel matter as intimate sexual behavior was seen as the result of a specific discourse of sexuality (Foucault 1976).

Foucault did reject such totalizing ideas as 'history', and 'society', a rejection that aligns him with Lyotard's rejection of 'grand narratives' such as that of 'progress'. He rejected all attempts to impose and overarching pattern on the discontinuities and struggles of social life. Like Derrida he emphasizes that the future is always 'open', never determined, and so there can be no development, no evolution and, in short, no history (Scott 1995: 187). Therefore, we find similarities in the approach and ideas of these two thinkers who have rejected the existentialism prevailed in modern social theory. These seminal ideas of Derrida and Foucault paved the way of another school of social

thought today known as 'Post-Modernism'. Thus, Post-structuralism and Post-Modernism have some common elements in their analysis.

Postmodernism: Origin, Meaning and Definitions

In the past three decades or so, postmodernism and globalization have been two highly contested terms not only in academic discourse but also in everyday discourses as well. There have been many attempts to sort out with some precision exactly what each term means, though, they both remain highly contested. Postmodernism arose at a moment when the notion of modernity, itself, was in various ways called into question. The idea that progress was inevitable, one of the basic tenets of modernization theory as well as of orthodox Marxist thought, was questioned. To some extent, it was due to the growing realization of the unintended consequences of the application of science and technology in order to solve a wide range of problems in the natural and social worlds. In the field of science, ecological and environmental critiques of the use of science and technology posed a challenge to this assumption of modernization theory. In the social field as well, a number of events in Post-war period also raised a question mark on the explanatory power of the theory of modernity.

Almost at the same time, the phenomenon of globalization also accelerated and intensified. The developed industrial nations witnessed the constriction of the manufacturing sector, leading to a process that became known as deindustrialization or the beginning of Post-Fordist economic order, whereas the developing world experienced the relocation of manufacturing plants in their countries (Dasgupta and Kivisto 2014: XII). The shift gave way to a theoretical account of the advent of Postindustrial society. The idea that automation would result in the reduction of workers needed in basic industries, while, no doubt partially correct, was only part of the story, the larger part being relocation of factory and the resultant substitution of workers in wealthy countries with workers from poor countries.

More recently, a counter-part of deindustrialization took off in earnest, the phenomena of downsizing the white color work-force, outsourcing the work to "off shore" locations, which meant the same places that the manufacturing jobs had ended earlier but economic globalization was about more than this. It involved the creation of global markets and the expansion of powerful transnational corporations, no longer rooted in or with allegiances to particular nations or their respective citizens.

The process of economic globalization was intimately connected with both political and cultural globalizations. Politically globalization has debatable implications for the notions of "NationState". The establishment of Supra-national institutions has made the nation state weak. American consumer culture has had parallel impact on global culture. It has exhibited enormous influence on the world. But it has not been a one-way-street resulting in the destruction of local cultures. On the contrary, one can find homogenization, American style side by side with efforts to shore up and strengthen local cultures. Moreover, one can find ample evidence of the interplay between the two, the growing hybridity of cultures.

The modern mass media have been considered as vehicle of Modernity. The basic assumption is that a culture of modernity in due course will replace all the pre-modern cultural forms conceptualized under the term traditional culture. The modern culture emphasizes on conspicuous high mass consumption. These patterns of high mass consumption are created through advertisements of various products among the masses. However, the socio-cultural philosophy of postmodernism "undermines the traditional notion of culture, as something fixed and hierarchical. It favours forms of culture that are transient of a moment, superficially pleasing and appealing to sense rather than reason" (McQuail 2010: 129). In contrast to modern culture, 'postmodern culture is volatile, illogical, kaleidoscopic and hedonistic'; 'It favours emotion over reason' (McQuail 2010:

129). Thus, 'massmedia culture has the advantage of appealing to many senses as well as being associated with novelty and transience' (McQuail 2010: 129). As a result, popular media culture reflects the elements of post-modernist culture.

For McQuail, "The cultural aesthetics of post-modernism involves a rejection of tradition and a search for novelty, invention, momentary enjoyment, nostalgia, playfulness, pastiche and inconsistency" (McQuail 2010: 130). Jameson (1984) refers to Post-modernism as a 'Cultural logic of late Capitalism', even though there is no logic to be found. Gitlin^{44a} suggests that Post-Modernism is specifically North American, capturing many features of American culture. Grossberg et.al. (1998) associate it especially with the process of commercialization of everything. Certainly the post-modern ethos, in view of McQuail (McQuail 2010: 130), 'is much more favourable to commerce than were earlier cultural perspectives'.

Ien Ang (1998) has also underlined the need to distinguish between conservative and critical Post-Modernism as intellectual attitudes. She writes that "the former does indeed succumb to "anything goes" attitude ...{but} the latter, critical Post-Modernism is motivated by a deep understanding of the limits and failures of what Habermas calls "the unfinished project of Modernity" ' (Ien Ang 1998: 78) .

Poster (2006: 138) argues that we should use the concept of postmodernity for the cultural study of slow media. Although, "in a manner that makes it suitable for analysis without either a celebratory fanfare or sarcastic smiles".

Post-Modernism, according to Bauman (2014:), 'is not at all the same thing as abandoning systematic social reflection or moral standards. Postmodernism promotes tolerance and diversity, although it demands in return a life lived without guarantees'. Post-Modern tolerance may degenerate into selfishness on the part of those who are affluent, compared with those who are poor, both within the nations and across the world. For tolerance of difference can also become precisely indifference: injustice is simply accepted as a part of a natural order of things, much as it was in pre-modern world. Yet in Bauman's view, the news is certainly not all bad. For the universalizing, tendencies of modernity have in the past often promoted totalitarian power.

As described by Bauman and also by Jean Baudrillard the post-modern order is one that privileges consumption rather than production. The consumer society is one of rapidly changing fashion, the constant creation of obsolescence of goods and a society without history. The object with which consumers are surrounded are not grounded in historical traditions and have no particular relations to the past. 'Profusion' is the most characteristic feature of consumer society. Shops crammed with goods, usually drawn from all parts of the world offer themselves to the buyer. The consumer is surrounded by objects rather than by persons: the accumulation of wealth has as its object the expansion of purchasing power. Objects gain their desirability from their position in the mosaic of other commodities. Action in consumer society has become more or less completely separate from external contexts: it is internally self-sufficient. Thus, a multipurpose drug store or a shopping mall contains a complete kaleidoscope of possible purchase.

Conclusion

There is great diversity among the postmodern thinkers and so it is difficult to offer generalizations on which the majority would agree. Smart (1993) has differentiated among three post-modernist positions:

1. The first, or extreme, post-modernist position is that there has been a radical rupture and modern society has been replaced by a post-modern society. Exponents of this point of view include Jean Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari.
2. The second position is that although a change has taken place, post-modernism grows out of, and is continuous with, modernism. This orientation is adhered to by Marxian thinkers such

as Fredric Jameson, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe and by post-modern feminists such as Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson.

3. Finally, there is the position adopted by Smart himself, that rather than viewing modernism and post-modernism as epochs, we can see them as engaged in a long running and ongoing set of relationships, with post modernism continually pointing out the limitations of modernism.

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New Communication Technologies and Levels of Modernity among the Middle Class Youth in India

Debanjana Nag

Abstract

The era of 21st century, a number of changes have been observed in every walk of social life including the field of art, economy, culture, technology and so on. The technological advancements in communication technologies haven't only brought the mass-media at centre-stage but also affected the material and non-material cultural life of both the rural and the urban dwellers. The traditional cultural norms and values of the society have given space to new cultural patterns among the youth who have high mass media exposure. In last two decades of the present century, the emergence of "new media" (Facebook, Whatsapp, You tube etc.) have bearings on the values and cultural patterns by facilitating the free flow of the cultural artifacts through web based global connectivity. It has an impact both on the material and the non-material culture. The present paper analyses the impact of globalization and communication on life style and cultural patterns of the middle class youth in an urban setting of a northern Indian, namely, Allahabad city in Eastern Uttar Pradesh.

Key words: *globalization, cultural change, new communication technologies, new media.*

There has been a very strong relationship among the concepts of modernity, communication technology and socio-cultural inequality since the emergence of a state. Modernity refers to the rational, scientific and logical reasoning towards a human being, culture and all societal issues. As a human being through its thought process leads towards modernity, the level of inequality present in that society also demolishes gradually and as a result new forms of structural and cultural institutions flourish. In this regard, the mass communication process has worked as an essential driving force to establish modernity and development in the non-European traditional societies. According to Pye (1963:24), "Mass Media communication is considered as an important vehicle of modernity as it is an integral part of modern communication system." By media exposure of a society one can understand the likes and dislikes, living style, attitude towards one another, cultural settings etc. that are customary in a social system. It helps people to think towards each other more rationally through the process of interaction and thus diminishes the caste, class and other socio-demographic barriers among people. The present paper is designed to study the level of mass media exposure of Indian society and how it helps in establishing modernity and social inclusion by overthrowing the traditional practices of socio-cultural thoughts and inequalities that

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were prevalent in the pre-globalization era. India has always portrayed itself as a country that is rich in its diverse traditional culture. It is a country with a vast population of 1.3 billion and each of them has their own material and non-material culture. The 21st century Indian society is mainly divided into rural and urban section of population in which the urban section relatively has higher level of modernity in comparison to rural areas. Therefore, to conduct this research an empirical study has been done among the middle-class youths in the urban settings of Eastern Uttar Pradesh. For this, a small purposive sample of 60 youths has been taken among which 38 males and 22 females are selected. The criteria of defining youths are done as per the definition given by National Youth Policy of India (2003) which covers all the youth in the country in the age group of 13 to 35 years.

Locale of the Study

The state of Uttar Pradesh lies in the Northern Gangetic Plains of India between 23°52'N and 31°28'N latitudes and 77°3' and 84°39'E longitudes and is the state with highest population in the country. The state is divided into two regions Eastern Uttar Pradesh and Western Uttar Pradesh due to its vast land area. The area of the present study is Eastern Uttar Pradesh, also known as '*Poorvanchal*' at the local level, covers 27 out of 75 districts of the state. The area has fertile alluvial soil throughout and witness the confluence of largest rivers of the country like Ganga, Yamuna, Gandak and many other rivers. At times the region experiences water logging problem and periodical floods in the rainy season. The major languages of the region are Avadhi and Bhojपुरी in assimilation known as Purbiyah language. The major religion of the area is Hinduism covering 94.73% of the total population. The level of educational system is moderate and almost 70% of the population still engages in agriculture and other primary activities though the urban areas have seen some growth in secondary and tertiary sectors in present scenario. According to Census Survey of India (2011), Varanasi and Prayagraj are two major comparatively developed districts among others. The region is mainly divided into four major caste i.e. Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya and Shudra in which the previous two belong to upper caste or General category, The vaishyas come under Other Backward Category (OBC), and accordingly the Shudras belong to lower caste or in Scheduled caste (SC) in the hierarchy of the social system. Some of the major Universities are present in this region and is highly connected with developed infrastructural services like transportation system, communication system etc. making it an educational hub for the youths. The previous mentioned reason certainly makes it suitable for taking the region as a study area for the present paper.

Population of the Study

As stated before the 63.3% of the study population consists of male whereas the female constitutes 36.7% in the study. All the population of the study belongs to mainly two different religions i.e. Hinduism (91.7%) and Islam (8.3%). Other religious communities belong to minorities. The study covers all the caste that exists in the society according to their availability in the region, among which 56.7% belongs to general castes category, 31.7% belongs to Other Backward Categories, 8.3% are Scheduled Caste and remaining 3.3% belongs to Scheduled Tribe.

As far as level of education of the participants is concerned the most of them are highly educated with 38.3% post-graduates, 31.7% graduates and 11.7% research students. The representation of the secondary and primary level educated youth is relatively low with 10% and 1.7% respectively. A few (6.7%) of them have professional/technical education.

On the basis of level of income a little more than half (28.4%) of them have low level of income (upto Rs. 20,000 per month) and almost same number of youth medium level of income (Rs. 20,000 to Rs. 40,000 per month), and remaining 43% of the respondents have relatively high income i.e. rs.40,000 per month.

Levels of Mass Media Exposure

The mass media can be primarily divided into Traditional media, modern mass media and new media. The traditional media refers to the old system of media communication like drum, post cards or print media. The modern mass media includes radio, television, cinema etc. while the new media is based on the new information and satellite technology . It includes mobile phone and internet. The exposure of media in the present istudy area can be mainly divided into four parts: the print media, the broadcasting media i.e. radio, the audio-visual media (Cinema and Television) and the new media. As the study shows the preference of media technology can be seen as follows among the youths:

Table 1: Patterns of Usage of Communication Technologies

S. No.	Media Type	Frequency	Percent
1.	New Media	55	91.7
2.	Print Media	4	6.7
3.	Audio-visualTelevision	1	1.7
4.	Broadcast Media	0	0.0
	Total	60	100.0

The above table reveals that most (91.7 %) of the youth today depend on mobile technology and internet. The use of Print media and television is diminished drastically with 6.7% and 1.7% respectively. in among the participants selected. There is no user of radio. It suggests that most of the youth today have shifted to new media and their communication needs are fulfilled by their mobile phone. Other forms of media have now lost their importance among the youth.

The Contents Preferred in General

The contents of media preferred by a person represent to his worldview. The data regarding contents mainly preferred by the viewers is shown in table 2:

Table 2: The Contents Preferred in General

S. No.	Content type	Frequency	Percent
1.	music	15	25.0
2.	serials and films	15	25.0
3.	news	14	23.3
4.	educational	13	21.6
5.	adult contents	1	1.7
6.	health and spiritual	1	1.7
7.	Historical Facts	1	1.7
	Total	60	100.0

The data reveals that the respondents prefer music, serials and films (25% in each case), news (23.3%) and educational contents in general on mass media. Other contents such as health, historical facts and adult contents have a low preference.

The New Media

It is the most popular form of media that contains social networking sites, different web channels and blogs and other methods of internet technology. The time spent by the respondent on new media is shown in table 3.

Table 3: Time Spent on New Media

S. No.	Time spent on new media	Frequency	Percent
1.	Less Than 2 hours	6	10.0
2.	2 hours to 4 hours	17	28.3
3.	4 hours to 6 hours	32	53.3
4.	more than 6 hours	5	8.3
	Total 60	100.0	100.0

The table shows that 53.3% of participants spend 4 to 6 hours on social media daily while a little more than one-fourth (28.3%) spend 2-4 hours on new media. However, a few (6%) of them spend less time (less than 2 hours) on new media. Thus, it can be said that the new communication technologies are the most preferred technology among the youth. According to this study, 38.3% of the participants agreed that they feel socially paralyze if they are not connected with internet. The most preferred content they browse on new media are shown in table 4.

Table 4: Most Preferred Online Contents

S. No.	Content type	Frequency	Percent
1.	Web Series	16	26.7
2.	News	14	23.3
3.	Educational	14	23.3
4.	Cinema and drama	10	16.7
5.	Adult contents	3	5.0
6.	Fashion	2	3.3
7.	Health and spiritual	1	1.7
	Total	60	100.0

The data indicate that the most preferred content is watching Web Series i.e. 26.7% of the respondents followed by news and educational consisting 23.3% each. The lowest percentage includes Health and spiritual that includes just 1.7% of the participants. One of the notable facts in this table is cinema that was one of the most attractive medium for entertainment has been replaced by Web series which is most popular among the youth. The preference of watching adult contents i.e. 5% also an indicator of changing dimensions of the culture especially in a traditional society like India where youths are now more open to see these contents that were restricted since ages leading towards a path of modernity.

Levels of Modernity

The levels of modernity can be judged by the attitude of people towards a particular thought. As stated earlier Modernity is a variable that diminishes conservatism in a society and hence, also discards the socio- cultural inequalities and disparities in the society. To examine this fact some of

the variables were taken into consideration to determine the levels of modernism that is continuing in the society:

1. Attitude towards Online Education:

The first question is related to online education particularly its role in spreading education to every person irrespective of their demographic, social and cultural background. The data reveal that three-fourth (75.0%) of the respondents believe that online system of education is a good platform to gain knowledge as it can reach to all the classes of the society very easily through the new media of communication. While a little more than one-seventh (13.3%) of the respondents are unsure about it and a little more than one-fifth (11.7%) of the respondents consider it not as a good method of communication as all the classes of the society are not digitally connected. It suggests that the majority of the youth have a positive attitude towards online education system.

2. View on *Pardah* System in the Family:

The respondents were asked to mention whether there is still *pardah* system in their family. In answering this question a little less than one-fifth (18.3%) of the respondents answered in affirmation, and most (81.7%) of them answered in negative that the *Pardah* system is not anymore practiced in the houses. There was an inequality on caste line among the practitioners *pardah* system as majority (64%) of them belongs to backward castes in comparison to 36% of the general category. Thus, majority of the respondents do not have practice of *Pardah* system in their family.

3. Attitude towards Online shopping:

The respondents were asked to mention about whether they purchase through online shopping and the items purchased by them through online shopping. Their responses are shown in table 5.

Table 5: Things Bought From Online Shopping Sites Mostly

S. No.	Items Purchased	Frequency	Percent
1.	Clothes and fashion	22	36.7
2.	Electronics	16	26.7
3.	Home needs and decors	13	21.7
4.	Food	6	10.0
5.	Books	2	3.3
6.	Groceries etc.	1	1.7
7.	Don't Buy	0	0
	Total	60	100.0

The data show that the all the youth used to purchase online However, their preference of items for online shopping varies as more than one-third (36.7%) of them are the consumer of clothes and fashion accessories followed by electronics (26.7%) and home decoration items (21.7%) and food (10%). While only a few of them purchase items like books (3.3%) and groceries etc. , the lowest percentage belong to groceries etc. (1.7%) online. Thus, cent percent youth are users of online marketing that eventually define them as social group that is digitally sound and has accepted the modern style of living.

4. Opinions regarding Marriage

The respondents were asked to respond regarding this choice about marriage. On the basis of their responses it was found that the majority (43.3%) of them prefer love marriage and a little more than one-fifth (21.7%) of them are in support of inter caste marriages. While a little less than

one-third (31.7%) express their choice of marriage within the caste. Those who prefer inter religious marriage have lowest percentage with only 3.3%. This suggests that today's young generation is in favour of love marriage but still they are bounded with the ties of caste and religion to a great extent.

5. Marriage through Online Matrimonials

The respondents were asked to mention their opinion regarding the searching of life partner through online matrimonials. it was found that most (56.7%) of the respondents in this category are unsure about the fact whether it is good or bad, while a little less than one-fourth (23.3%) of them were not in favour of such marriages only one-fifth (20.0%) of them consider it a good method for searching life partner. It clearly indicates that the people still give preference to traditional approach for searching a suitable match for marriage.

6. Chat and communication between boy and girl over Mobile Phones

On this issue, most (93.3%) of the respondents believe that it is not a big deal if the boys and girls communicate over mobile phones whereas 6.7% of them believe that it is not acceptable in our society and should not be done. It shows that most of the respondents are liberal on this issue.

7. Qualities for holding High Ranks

The respondents were asked to mention the qualities of a person for holding a high rank. Their responses are shown in table 6.

Table 6: Qualities for holding High Ranks

S. No.	Qualities	Frequency	Percent
1.	His family background should be higher.	3	5.0
2.	He should be traditionalistic or well disciplined.	14	23.3
3.	He should be famous among people	2	3.3
4.	He should be highly qualified or should possess some extra knowledge	41	68.3
	Total	60	100.0

The data show that majority of respondents (68.3%) hold that one should have necessary qualification to achieve high rank offices whereas among the remaining, 23.3% regards traditionalistic or well discipline, 5% high family background, and 3.35 famous as quality to hold high rank office. Thus, majority of youth emphasises on merit rather than other qualities.

8. Methods for Progress of the Country

The respondents were asked to mention how can a country make a progress? Their responses are shown in table 7.

Table 7: Methods to make the Country more Progressive

S.No.	Methods for Progress of the Country	Frequency	Percent
a.	People should do hard work.	11	18.3
b.	Ensuring good education facility by all individuals in their family.	33	55.0
c.	Better planning of programmes by the Government	16	26.7
d.	To depend on God or Fate	0	0.0
Total		60	100.0

The data shows that most of the respondent consider ensuring good education facility by all individuals in their family (55.0%), better planning of programmes by the government in case of 26.7% respondents and hardwork in case of 18.3% respondents. No one regarded fate or god for this.

9. Opinion on Family Planning:

The respondents were asked to express their views on family planning. Their responses are shown in table 8.

Table 8: Views on Family Planning

S. No	.Methods for Progress of the Country	Frequency	Percent
a.	Couples should follow the rules of family planning and have a small family so that they can bring up their children in a better way.	55	91.7
b.	Large families are better as larger number of people can give strength to the family both economically and in terms of power	5	8.3
	Total	60	100.0

The data show that most of the respondent (91.7%) have modern attitude towards family planning and thinks that couples should follow the rules of family planning and have a small family so that they can bring up their children in a better way whereas only 8.3% of them have traditional belief that large families are better as larger number of people can give strength to the family both economically and in terms of power.

10. Relation of Being Atheist and Good Person:

The question tries to find out the belief system of youth and how much it impact their attitude towards the perspective of others. According to the respondents 36.7% percentage of them believe that an atheist is surely a better person and have good values whereas 21.7% of them belief that being atheist is not good and they creates orthodox system in the society . Whereas 41.7% of the respondents that is the highest in numbers believe that there is no relation in being atheist and good person as it depends on individuals moral. It clearly shows that though there is a traditional attitude in this regard still youths are leading towards a modern and rational thought process.

11. Changing attitude towards Working Women

This variable has been taken into consideration to find out the opinions of youth on the fact that whether the exposure to new media have changed the attitude towards working women class or not. Most (68.3%) of the respondents feel that it has positively changed the attitude while less than one-third (30.0%) of them believe that it has changed to some extent. Only few (1.7%) of the respondents believe that there is no change in this perspective. The analysis clearly indicate that the exposure to new communication technologies has made a positive attitude among the youth in this regard.

12. Destruction of local cultures and Traditions due to Social Media

The respondents opinion regarding the negative impact of new media on the society indicate that one-third (33.3%) of the respondents believe that social media is destroying the traditional peculiarities of a culture, while two-fifth (40.0%) of them believe that it is destroying to some extent

only; however, a little more than one-fourth (26.7%) of them think that there is no impact of social media in destruction of local cultures.

Conclusion

On the basis of the above mentioned analysis following conclusions can be drawn:

1. The exposure of the youth to new communication technologies is very high (100%);
2. The fact that 53.3% of the users spend 4 to 6 hours in social media clearly shows that the young generation is highly depending on the virtual world to create a relationship with others. Many variables including preference of educational system through online or digital mode (75.0%), preference of watching educational content and news on web (46.6%) other than entertainment section certainly describes that the urban youth are more aware of education both physically and virtually which is also evidenced by the fact that 88.3% of the respondents irrespective of all caste are having education level up to doctoral, post graduate and graduate or professional level which is a good indicator for development of the society.
3. Besides, conveying more attention on buying goods from online markets (100.0%), accepting the communication over mobile technology among both the primary genders (93.3%) and changing attitude towards working women due to communication system as they feel more secure and connected to go anywhere now (68.3%) etc. are also some of the variables showing that the correlation between mass media exposure and level of modernity carries out a positive relationship.
4. Apart from, mass media there are some other factors too that are responsible for deciding the level of modernity in the society i.e. the caste, economic conditions like income and occupation, family background of the respondent etc. But with the development of new communication technologies, the questions like caste, class etc. that were more prevalent in pre- globalization era are gradually becoming weak due to easy accessibility of educational and infrastructural amenities especially in digital modes and thus forming a linear form of homogeneity in all the above stated factors especially among youths of urban settings.
5. Some changes in the psychological and thinking process of the youths have also been observed like accepting the atheists, believing good education or better Government policies are needed for development, people should have good qualification for holding an office or views in family planning that smaller families are better for ensuring children's better future (91.7%) etc. are some of the changes towards the modernistic attitude.
6. However, there are some phenomenon like marriage system where the youth give preference to traditional system of marriage rather than online matrimonial, accepting love marriage but either within caste or in some conditions inter-caste marriages but not outside the religion etc. show that these are the some primary customs where people likes their own traditional norms and will take more time to acquire modern approach.
7. The opinion that social media destroys the local culture to some extent is also an element that shows that the techno-freak Indian youths are ready to welcome the modernistic aspects of the society but contrarily they are also endeavor to preserve their old cultural traditions. Mass media does not impact modernity as a whole but it immensely affects the thought process of people, sometimes by leading them towards modernistic opinions to discard socio- cultural inequalities and sometimes by checking the path of modernity to save the indigenous norms. But certainly in both of the conditions, the new communication technologies have become a part and parcel to establish modernity especially among the developing countries like India where the major section of population belongs to the age group of youths.

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